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  When organizations act in ways that offend the public interest, 
parties seeking to change that behavior traditionally turned to litigation 
to force these organizations to reform, whether by command or 
consent. For example, following Brown v. Board of Education, 
“structural reform litigation” forced large-scale organizations, from 
school boards to prisons, to change their practices. Similarly, federal 
prosecutors have used agreements with large corporations to introduce 
significant structural reforms. 
  This Article identifies an alternative strategy for organizational 
change that relies on the indirect reputational effects of litigation. Under 
this approach, organizational change does not result from court order 
or parties’ settlement but from the informational effects of litigation: 
litigation transmits information about an organization into the public 
space; this information has reputational consequences for the affected 
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organizations; voluntary organizational change is a response to that 
reputational shaming. Critically, these reputational sanctions can 
accompany all types of litigation and not just those specifically seeking 
structural reform remedies. 
  This Article identifies and explains the operation of four 
reputational sanctions: financial, policy, regulatory spillover, and 
barriers to entry. We are most familiar with the financial sanction, 
where consumers adopt “naming and shaming” boycotts to punish 
corporations for their behavior, thereby encouraging the latter to 
change their practices. But reputational sanctions also take the other 
three forms and can encourage large organizations to change their 
practices even when financial sanctions are weak or inoperative. 
Collectively, these reputational sanctions—operating outside the 
boundaries of traditional legal and regulatory processes—are 
employed by both public and private actors and play an increasing role 
in the decisions that organizations make. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our daily lives are influenced by the conduct of organizations: 
political committees, professional associations, labor unions, 
multinational corporations, religious entities, financial institutions, and 
healthcare providers, to name a few. When these organizations behave 
badly, our traditional recourse is litigation.1 Since Brown v. Board of 
Education,2 litigants have used “structural reform” lawsuits to force 
school boards,3 prisons,4 police departments,5 and other public 
organizations to change for the better. 
But it is not only public organizations that can pose a threat to 
society. Media headlines are filled with stories of misconduct by private 
organizations: Whole Foods profits from slave labor;6 Google sells 
 
 1. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1282–83 (1979); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term – Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1979). 
 2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 869–70 (2007). 
 4. Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in 
Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 848–60 (1990). 
 5. Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. 
L. REV. 1343, 1378–96 (2015). 
 6. Adam Chandler, Walmart, Whole Foods, and Slave-Labor Shrimp, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 
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users’ data;7 the National Football League (NFL) hides the effects of 
head trauma;8 Wells Fargo creates “fake accounts.”9 While “structural 
reform prosecution” has been used to change private organizations, 
this Article identifies an alternative strategy that relies on the 
informational effects of litigation. As this Article explains, litigation 
releases information about organizational conduct into the public 
domain. This information has reputational consequences for the 
affected organizations. Organizational change is a response to that 
reputational shaming.10 
Under this approach, organizational change does not result from 
a court order or parties’ settlement. The engine for change is 
reputation, and the fuel for that engine is information. Over the past 
few years, for example, the NFL has faced a series of lawsuits from 
injured players who claimed that the NFL knew about the dangers of 
head injuries but hid those risks and failed to mitigate those risks.11 As 
attention to head injuries from the media, athletes, and fans grew, the 
NFL introduced a series of new protocols to prevent and better 
understand head injuries, culminating in 2016’s $100 million initiative 




 7. Mark Hachman, The Price of Free: How Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Google Sell 
You to Advertisers, PCWORLD (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2986988/ 
privacy/the-price-of-free-how-apple-facebook-microsoft-and-google-sell-you-to-advertisers.html 
[https://perma.cc/P43B-YV5H].  
 8. Jim Avila, Enjoli Francis & Lauren Pearle, Former NFL Players File Lawsuit Against 
League on Concussions, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nfl-players-file-
lawsuit-league-concussions/story?id=16514359 [https://perma.cc/7ZWM-PT36]. 
 9. Matt Egan, 5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired over 2 Million Phony Accounts, CNN 
MONEY (Sept. 9, 2016, 8:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/wells-fargo-created-
phony-accounts-bank-fees [https://perma.cc/5V94-TH9Y]. 
 10. Reputational shaming through litigation can also be used against public organizations. 
See, e.g., Emily Chiang, Institutional Reform Shaming, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 76 (2015) 
(“[R]eform shaming seeks to induce those who operate institutions like schools and prisons to 
comply with the law for fear of being shamed if they do not.”). However, the focus of this Article 
is the use of reputational sanctions against private organizations.  
 11. See Plaintiff’s Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint at 4, In re Nat’l 
Football Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB) 
(“The NFL . . . was aware of the evidence and the risks associated with repetitive traumatic brain 
injuries virtually at the inception, but deliberately ignored and actively concealed the information 
from the Plaintiffs and all others who participated in organized football at all levels.”). 
 12. Roger Goodell, NFL Commitment to Player Health and Safety: A Letter from 
Commissioner Roger Goodell (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.playsmartplaysafe.com/commitment-
letter [https://perma.cc/8JW3-3JYR] [hereinafter Goodell Letter]; see also Press Release, 
National Football League, NFL, NFLPA Announce Policy to Enforce Concussion Protocol (July 
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to additional medical research and dissemination of that research13 and 
has changed officiating rules, practice guidelines, and training 
methods, among other commitments and improvements.14 
Reputational effects are not unique to litigation, but also apply to 
other adjudicative processes, such as agency proceedings; 
organizational change can follow from the reputational effects of all 
these adjudicative processes.15 For example, Wells Fargo angered 
many of its banking customers when it was revealed in September 2016 
that Wells Fargo’s employees had “secretly created millions of 
unauthorized bank and credit card accounts—without their customers 
knowing it—since 2011.”16 The Consumer Financial Protection Board 
(CFPB) fined Wells Fargo $100 million plus penalties for its sales 
practices, but that figure is only a fraction of the loss that Wells Fargo 
suffered because of its tainted reputation.17 One study found that, as 
consumers switch to other banks in the wake of the scandal, Wells 
Fargo could lose almost $100 billion in deposits plus another $4 billion 
in revenue over the next two years.18 Additionally, this scandal affects 
more than just Wells Fargo’s reputation; it also affects the reputation 
of the broader banking industry, which has been attempting to regain 
 
25, 2016), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000676669/article/nfl-nflpa-announce-policy-
to-enforce-concussion-protocol [https://perma.cc/7YAS-98WS] (“Furthering their commitment 
to protecting the health and safety of NFL players, the NFL and NFLPA today announced an 
agreement to enforce the NFL Game Day Concussion Protocol and discipline clubs that violate 
it.”). 
 13. Goodell Letter, supra note 12 ( “Our primary interest is in keeping our players and the 
public informed about these important health issues. As we gain new insights or discover new 
challenges, we will share them, so you will know them as well.”). 
 14. Id.  
 15. See Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 
BYU L. REV. 1371, 1379 (2011) (discussing agency use of adverse publicity to compensate for 
limited statutory enforcement authority); Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative 
Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380, 1381 (1973) (examining the risks of “adverse agency publicity,” 
which are “affirmative measures taken by an agency which, by calling public attention to agency 
action, may adversely affect persons identified in the publicity.”); Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 
DUKE L.J. 1841, 1851 (2011) (defending the use of informational threats by agencies in dynamic 
industries). For further discussion on the informational effects of complaints filed under the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), see infra Part V.D.  
 16. Egan, supra note 9. 
 17. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized 
Accounts (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-
opening-unauthorized-accounts [https://perma.cc/UFJ9-KX2B]. 
 18. CG42, WELLS FARGO MINI-STUDY 3 (2016), http://cg42.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/12/cg42-Wells-Fargo-Mini-Study-102016vF.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CH9-85LJ] . 
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public confidence since the financial crisis of 2008.19 To satisfy the 
public demand for accountability and appease consumers and 
policymakers, other banks are now considering changing their 
practices on recovery of executive compensation.20 
A number of scholars have explored the unique information-
forcing effects of litigation for litigants,21 judges,22 and the broader 
public.23 For a number of reasons, organizational actors possess 
 
 19. Evan Ramstad, U.S. Bancorp’s Richard Davis Says Banks Are Still Fighting for Their 
Reputation, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2016, 9:09 PM), http://www.startribune.com/u-s-bancorp-profit-
continues-steady-march/397576481/ [https://perma.cc/3HWS-6MUK]. 
 20. The compensation changes concern the recovery of executive compensation through 
clawback policies that allow issuers to recover compensation from executives under certain 
conditions. Many companies had already adopted some form of a clawback policy prior to the 
Wells Fargo scandal. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Item 402 of Regulation S-K 
require reporting and clawback provisions for certain executives. Listing Standards for Recovery 
of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 41,145–46 (proposed July 14, 2015) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249, 274). Additionally, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the Securities & Exchange Commission 
(SEC) proposed Rule 10D-1 in July 2015. Press Release, U.S. SEC, SEC Proposes Rules 
Requiring Companies to Adopt Clawback Policies on Executive Compensation (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-136.html [https://perma.cc/3QT7-6KSK]. The 
proposed rule would require national securities exchanges to adopt listing standards that would 
require issuers to adopt, disclose, and comply with clawback policies, which must meet certain 
specified criteria. Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, supra, 
at 41,146. Against this backdrop, “[b]ankers fear not only that the new rules on pay will be 
tightened as a result of the furor at Wells Fargo but also that boards will go beyond them to avoid 
a political backlash.” Olivia Oran & Ross Kerber, Wells Fargo’s CEO Pay Clawback Puts Wall 
Street Executives on Notice, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2016, 6:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-wells-fargo-accounts-clawbacks-idUSKCN11Y358 [https://perma.cc/D74H-EZ3N]. 
 21. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2017) (proposing that judges in 
multidistrict litigation (MDL) cases use their role to force information disclosure, enabling parties 
in MDL cases to reach informed decisions on whether or not to accept proposed settlements). 
Hadfield and Ryan explain:  
The power that parties wield when they become the abstract persons ‘Plaintiff’ and 
‘Defendant’ in civil court, then, is a rather extraordinary capacity to call on the power 
of the state to enforce obligations to disclose information. Outside of the courtroom 
and the relationship of Plaintiff and Defendant there is no such power: a person who 
has a grievance against another has only the tools that fall to his or her individual status 
to obtain information. 
Gillian K. Hadfield & Dan Ryan, Democracy, Courts and the Information Order, 54 EUR. J. SOC. 
67, 81 (2013).  
 22. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion 
to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437, 450 (2013) (proposing limited discovery at motion to 
dismiss stage). 
 23. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 
1657, 1683–90 (2016) (discussing transparency benefits for the public); Roy Shapira, Reputation 
Through Litigation: How the Legal System Shapes Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. 
L. REV. 1193, 1213 (2016) (discussing second-opinion effects of the courts). 
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information about their practices that are unknown to anyone else, but 
it is often not in their interest to share it. Litigation forces that 
information into the public. 
This Article explores the related but distinct information-
transmission function of litigation: litigation as a mechanism to 
disseminate information in society at large. While the two functions—
information forcing and information transmission—often overlap and 
operate in tandem, the information-transmission function is distinct in 
a few ways. First, it does not concern the revelation of new information, 
but the dissemination and amplification of information that may 
already be publicly available. The information-transmission function is 
significant because availability does not equal attention: we often 
ignore or otherwise miss information to which we have access. 
Litigation brings it to our attention, often with the aid of the media, 
which frames it within compelling narratives and elevates its profile, 
thereby expanding the audience for it.24 
Second, because the information-transmission function is not as 
concerned with new information, it operates even if the parties do not 
reach the discovery stage, where information-forcing functions are 
exercised. The information-transmission function takes effect earlier, 
even at the filing of the initial complaint.25 Measures that restrict 
information-forcing functions of litigation may therefore not similarly 
impede the information-transmission functions. However, measures 
that restrict the flow of information from the courts to the public, such 
as confidentiality measures or alternative dispute resolution, would 
impede the transmission function.26 
Finally, the information-transmission function helps to produce a 
range of reputational sanctions. This Article describes four distinct 
reputational sanctions produced by litigation or government 
 
 24. See Katerina Linos & Kimberly Twist, The Supreme Court, the Media, and Public 
Opinion: Comparing Experimental and Observational Methods, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 227–28 
(2016) (discussing the features of Supreme Court cases that increase the likelihood of media 
coverage).  
 25. See Chiang, supra note 10, at 104 (“The complaint in today’s institutional reform 
litigation is a powerful shame-generating tool. The idea of the complaint as an opportunity for 
story telling is not a new one, and litigators know that the most compelling cases rest upon the 
most compelling stories.”). 
 26. Laurie Kratky Doré, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina’s New 
Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 798–99 (2004); Andrew D. 
Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to Information 
Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 379 (2006); Minna J. Kotkin, Secrecy 
in Context: The Shadowy Life of Civil Rights Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 583–84 (2006).  
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investigation: financial, policy, regulatory spillover, and barriers to 
entry. This analysis is important—even to lawyers who already 
incorporate reputational effects into their litigation strategies—
because we need to understand how litigation creates reputational 
sanctions and the mechanics by which these sanctions drive change.27 
Financial sanctions are the most familiar, as we often associate 
them with “naming and shaming” campaigns and consumer boycotts of 
companies exposed as polluters, human rights abusers, cheaters, or 
liars. These types of financial sanctions are wielded by consumers who 
convert information of misdeeds into financial consequences for an 
organization, as opposed to financial penalties imposed directly by 
adjudicatory processes. Policy sanctions result when an organization’s 
reputation undermines or leaves it without any legitimacy to offer 
policy solutions, as when tobacco companies tried to help make health 
policy after their public relations tactics were revealed.28 The 
regulatory spillover sanction occurs when the misdeeds of one bad 
industry actor compromise the reputation of its industry peers. 
Consider Volkswagen (VW) and the effects of its cheating scandal for 
auto manufacturers around the world, as other national regulators 
initiated investigations into the emissions performances of VW and of 
its competitors.29 Finally, reputational sanctions can serve as a barrier 
to entry for new businesses in a market. Incumbent businesses use 
reputational sanctions strategically to delegitimize a potential 
competitor in the public’s mind,30 as when the taxi industry raised 
 
 27. Chiang, supra note 10, at 87 (arguing for improved understanding of how litigation 
shames organizations, even when litigators already employ these strategies in their “playbook”).  
 28. Thomas Bollyky & David Fidler, Has a Global Tobacco Treaty Made a Difference? 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/02/has-a-global-
tobacco-treaty-made-a-difference/386399/ [https://perma.cc/A7KX-M92J] (describing how 
revelations about the tobacco industry’s “systematic industry deception” about health effects led 
to its ostracism as “a global pariah,” and simultaneously increased support for an international 
treaty on tobacco control and “undermin[ed] the industry’s attempts to kill it”).  
 29. See William Boston, Volkswagen Emissions Investigations Should Widen to Entire Auto 
Industry, Officials Say, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2015, 7:51 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
volkswagen-emissions-investigations-should-widen-to-entire-auto-industry-officials-say-1442915
079 [https://perma.cc/NEG3-CSHJ] (reporting that French, British, German, and Italian 
regulators were considering investigating the broader auto industry for similar emissions fraud).  
 30. Alex Bitektine, Legitimacy-Based Entry Deterrence in Inter-Population Competition, 11 
CORP. REPUTATION REV. 73, 76 (2008). 
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allegations against Uber31 or the hotel chains against Airbnb.32 
As previously mentioned, reputational sanctions are not unique 
products of litigation. But one attribute that makes litigation special is 
the way it attracts media attention;33 the media may not be as likely to 
follow allegations unsupported by litigation.34 Because litigation draws 
in the media, which can then act as an information intermediary, it can 
expand the audience for the information shared within the judicial 
process.35 
Reputational regulation is not the first strategy to capitalize on the 
indirect effects of litigation. The extensive scholarship on social 
movements illuminates the benefits of litigation for public education, 
political mobilization, identity formation, resource allocation 
(primarily from elites), and values validation, among other benefits.36 
All these benefits foster conditions conducive for organizational 
 
 31. Serena Saitto, Inside Big Taxi’s Dirty War with Uber, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2015, 8:00 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-11/inside-big-taxi-s-dirty-war-with-uber 
[https://perma.cc/9R28-Q72R] (explaining how the taxi trade association hired a publicity expert 
to gather and disseminate unfavorable information about Uber). 
 32. Christopher Elliott, Big Hotels’ Plan To Win Customers from Airbnb, FORTUNE (Jan. 
27, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/01/27/big-hotels-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/2QG2-
8HVL] (explaining that the hotel industry is funding research suggesting that “some Airbnb 
operators are running ‘illegal’ hotels”).  
 33. Perry Parks, Summer for the Scientists? The Scopes Trial and the Pedagogy of Journalism, 
92 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 444, 445 (2015) (“The trial was a major news event that 
attracted up to two hundred reporters and included the first live radio broadcast from a 
courtroom.”). 
 34. RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 194 
(2015) (“[T]he media is more likely to cover the press release about a lawsuit than a press release 
about legal claims not backed by a lawsuit. In the latter case, the absence of action creates doubt 
whether the [attorney general] actually believes the claim he is making.”).  
 35. See Linos & Twist, supra note 24, at 225, 232 (“[T]he media’s role is distinctly important 
to the [Supreme] Court’s influence on public opinion.” (citing RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND 
IMAGES THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 16 (1994))); id. at 232 (“[M]edia coverage of both 
health care and immigration issues spiked after the Supreme Court decisions to levels not seen 
before or since; no other actor or event, including the presidential debates, placed as much media 
attention on these issues as the Supreme Court.”). 
 36. See, e.g., JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: THEORY OF 
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 214 (1978) (explaining how social reform groups used legal 
proceedings to create unfavorable publicity that forced parties into a settlement); Chiang, supra 
note 10 at 59–61 (describing similar strategies); Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 477, 489 (2004) (describing social-mobilization effects of publicity) [hereinafter 
Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest]; Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical 
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 959–62 (2007) 
(discussing effects of litigation on social mobilization). See generally Douglas NeJaime, Winning 
Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011) (discussing the benefits to social movements from 
losing litigation battles). 
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change. For example, in the discrimination context, “law reformers do 
not expect to achieve results through a court or administrative  
order . . . . Rather, they use legal proceedings to generate harmful 
publicity that will force the discriminator into a settlement.”37 Along 
these lines, the Environmental Defense Fund used litigation 
concerning the use of DDT to “dramatize the dangers of 
environmental degradation and to launch a massive, and successful, 
fund-raising drive.”38 
Reputational regulation similarly focuses on the particular 
institutional vulnerabilities of the organizations at issue. Specifically, 
reputational sanctions encourage organizational change by bringing an 
organization to a crisis point where it is denied access to a resource it 
values—capital, market entry, policymaking role, autonomy—unless it 
demonstrates change to those withholding those resources. 
This Article’s central thesis is intuitive. We expect demonstrations 
of good behavior by organizations that have lost public favor: change 
follows scandal. What this Article adds to our collective intuition is a 
deeper analysis of the mechanisms through which the latter leads to the 
former. This Article differentiates between different types of 
reputational sanctions, begins to understand the roles of litigants and 
prosecutors, and identifies the information-transmission functions of 
litigation. 
Better understanding of these reputational dynamics leads to a 
number of normative implications for civil and criminal litigation 
strategy. This analysis reveals the importance of process over 
outcomes—the release of information through the adjudicative process 
potentially results in organizational change that may be more 
significant than any remedy or punishment a court could order, if a case 
even survives that long. This is consistent with the view that “litigation 
itself can be a valuable player in the marketplace of ideas and that the 
publicity gained for causes via litigation may benefit the cause 
regardless of whether the litigators actually prevail in the courts.”39 The 
analysis offered here reveals additional benefits of prioritizing process 
over outcome. It also reveals that the costs to the public interest of 
 
 37. HANDLER, supra note 36, at 214. 
 38. Id. at 216. 
 39. Chiang, supra note 10, at 69–70; see also Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 
36, at 479 (“[C]ourts not only function as adjudicators of private disputes, or institutions that 
implement social reforms, but as arenas where political and social movements agitate for, and 
communicate, their legal and political agenda.”).  
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court secrecy and arbitration may be higher than many suspect; these 
impediments obstruct not only the public-notice function but also the 
effect of reputational incentives and, consequently, the likelihood of 
responsive organizational change. Finally, it reveals a more 
comprehensive picture of the impact of litigation, whether desirable or 
not. 
Though the focus of this analysis is on organizational change, not 
all organizational change will be desirable. Reputational sanctions are 
difficult to calibrate and their effects are difficult to predict or control. 
These sanctions may impose costs far exceeding any wrong committed, 
or may even impose costs when there was no wrong. Reputational 
sanctioning through the courts reduces the risk of abuse because of the 
gatekeeping function performed by pleading standards, professional 
rules, the adversarial process of truth finding, and review by judge and 
jury, among other checks. These checks distinguish the production of 
reputational sanctions via courts from the production of reputational 
sanctions through other channels. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses two ways that 
direct incentives have been used by litigators, courts, and prosecutors 
to encourage organizational change. It also explains the origins of 
organizational reputations and emphasizes the importance of 
information availability to stakeholders. Part I concludes by explaining 
the various advantages of the courts and the media, individually and 
collectively, in producing information that stakeholders use to evaluate 
organizations. Part III discusses four types of reputational sanctions—
financial, regulatory spillover, policy, and entry—and provides a case 
illustration of each. The case illustrations are taken from recent 
organizational scandals playing out in the headlines and before courts, 
congressional hearings, and government investigations: the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) investigation 
(financial), the Wells Fargo fine (regulatory spillover), the civil suits 
against Uber (barrier to entry), and the responses of the oil and gas 
industry to climate change policymaking (policy). 
Part III discusses the potential risks of reputational regulation, 
including the risk of frivolous litigation (such as in “strike suits”),40 and 
concerns about litigation transparency and arbitration for reputational 
sanctions. Finally, Part IV concludes by identifying the implications of 
 
 40. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 532 (1991); James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-
Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 916 (1996). 
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reputational regulation for evaluating the success of legal institutions, 
identifying litigation objectives, and the reputational regulatory 
potential of other legal institutions. 
I.  ENCOURAGING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THROUGH 
REPUTATION 
There are a number of ways that legal institutions can encourage 
organizations to change. Organizational change can result from court 
order or non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements. 
However, the reputational effects of litigation and prosecution can also 
indirectly encourage organizations to change their practices. Section A 
describes how structural reform litigation and prosecution illustrate a 
direct means by which legal institutions compel defendant 
organizations into organizational change. It also explains the 
informational effects produced by those legal institutions and the role 
that the media plays in heightening those effects. Section B explains 
how those informational effects make organizations more willing to 
change and to borrow practices from other organizations. Legal 
institutions can thus be used to indirectly encourage organizational 
change. 
A. Understanding the Information Effects of the Courts 
Following Brown v. Board of Education, litigants requested 
injunctive remedies to change the practices of public organizations. In 
structural reform litigation, judges became architects of change within 
large public organizations in order to bring these organizations into 
alignment with Constitutional requirements.41 Structural reform 
litigation departed from traditional dispute resolution in significant 
ways.42 The focus of structural reform was not upon “particular 
incidents or transactions” but instead on “a social condition that 
threatens important constitutional values and the organizational 
dynamic that creates and perpetuates that condition.”43 The victim in a 
structural suit is usually a group, not an individual, and the 
beneficiaries of the structural remedies may include individuals outside 
the victim group.44 Finally, the hallmark of structural reform litigation 
 
 41. Paul Gewitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588 (1983). 
 42. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1282–83 (describing traditional litigation as bipolar, 
retrospective, right-remedy interdependent, self-contained, and party-initiated/party-controlled).  
 43. Fiss, supra note 1, at 18.  
 44. Id. at 19–22.  
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is its remedial focus that aims at institutional change.45 
In the years following Brown, structural reform litigation 
expanded from desegregation cases to include reform of other 
organizations of public concern such as mental asylums and prisons.46 
Today, however, structural reform litigation faces a number of 
criticisms and obstacles, including concerns with procedural barriers;47 
functional competence;48 supervision and enforcement of structural 
decrees;49 separation of powers;50 and high costs of implementation, 
especially for poorer municipalities.51 
Prosecutors similarly seek organizational change within business 
organizations through deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) or 
non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) to obtain organizational 
cooperation in significant structural reform of corporate entities 
implicated in wrongdoing.52 The terms that organizations must agree to 
usually relate to internal reform of the organization, cooperation with 
investigations into individual employees, restitution payments, and 
external monitoring.53 
Like structural reform litigation, organizational reform through 
DPAs and NPAs has attracted criticism. Critics have raised concerns 
 
 45. See id. at 27 (noting that such litigation focuses on shaping remedies in the context of the 
ongoing relationship between judges and institutions).  
 46. Garrett, supra note 3, at 857.  
 47. Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still 
Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 161 (2003). 
 48. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial 
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1138 (1996). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 1140.  
 51. Rushin, supra note 5, at 1408–09. 
 52. Garrett, supra note 3, at 888 (“DOJ avoids trial by entering into pre-trial diversion 
agreements, permitting organizations to commit to a rehabilitative program, and agreeing to defer 
prosecution should they comply.”). These agreements reflect the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines that created significant incentives for internal structures that monitor for wrongdoing. 
Id. at 860.  
 53. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal 
Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea 
Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 588–90 (2015) (comparing the increased use of 
governance provisions in DPAs and NPAs compared to plea agreements). For example, in 2005, 
accounting firm KPMG came under investigation by different government bodies for engaging in 
tax fraud. Garrett, supra note 3, at 861. After the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a criminal 
tax complaint against KPMG, the parties reached an agreement setting forth significant structural 
change at KPMG: restrictions on its tax practice, implementation of compliance and ethics 
programs, training programs, and protection for whistleblowers, among others. Id. at 863–65. In 
exchange, the DOJ and the IRS ended the criminal prosecution of KPMG. Id. at 862. 
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regarding expertise,54 selectivity issues,55 use of corporate monitors,56 
the inclusion of unrelated provisions,57 lack of judicial oversight of 
DPAs and NPAs,58 broad scope of prosecutorial discretion,59 and the 
requirement of privilege waivers until the practice was later 
discouraged.60 
In structural reform litigation or prosecution, there is a direct and 
close causal connection between the legal institution and the 
organizational change: a judge orders a particular remedy or a 
prosecutor and organization enter into an agreement addressing 
organizational reform. Reputational regulation is an alternative 
approach wherein public and civil actors rely on the reputational 
sanctions produced by litigation and other legal processes to encourage 
private organizations to change.61 Reputational sanctions are a by-
product of the normal operation of our adjudicative processes. These 
sanctions can accompany even garden-variety civil suits because they 
do not rest upon the remedy sought but upon the reputational impact 
of the suit. They can accompany all types of litigation or investigation, 
not just those seeking organizational change. The mechanism for 
organizational change is not court or contract but reputation.  
Definitions of organizational reputation are plentiful, particularly 
depending on the organization being discussed,62 but many scholars 
who specifically study corporations agree that corporate reputations 
 
 54. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the 
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1326 (2013) (noting concern that 
the focus of NPAs and DPAs on corporate compliance programs “involve[s] the Department in 
management controls and structural reform that may go beyond its core area of litigation 
expertise”).  
 55. Id. at 1327 (discussing selectivity issues based on firm size and nationality).  
 56. Veronica Root, The Monitor-Client Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 533, 541–43 
(2014) (providing examples from the Statoil, Total, and InVision DPAs, among others). 
 57. Garrett, supra note 3, at 917–18; Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the New 
Regulators: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 174 
(2008). 
 58. Uhlmann, supra note 54, at 1328–29.  
 59. See Garrett, supra note 3, at 918–31 (exploring the implications of and counterweights to 
such broad discretion). 
 60. Spivack & Raman, supra note 57, at 180.  
 61. See supra Part I.B (explaining similar reputational strategies examined by social 
movements theorists and contrasting those strategies with “reputational regulation”).  
 62. Violina P. Rindova, Ian O. Williamson, Antoaneta P. Petkova & Joy Marie Sever, Being 
Good or Being Known: An Empirical Examination of the Dimensions, Antecedents, and 
Consequences of Organizational Reputation, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1033, 1036 tbl.1 (2005) 
(collecting definitions of reputation from marketing, sociology, economics, and other disciplines). 
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result from what many different actors think about it.63 For example, 
leading reputational analyst Charles Fombrun defines corporate 
reputation “as the overall estimation in which a company is held by its 
constituents. . . . represent[ing] the ‘net’ affective or emotional 
reaction—good or bad, weak or strong—of customers, investors, 
employees, and the general public to the company’s name.”64 The 
“good” or “bad” reputation that a corporation winds up with is “the 
aggregate of many personal judgments about the company’s 
credibility, reliability, responsibility, and trustworthiness.”65 
Corporate reputation matters to different stakeholders because it 
helps them “gauge the probable outcomes of interacting with a 
particular organization.”66 As such, a corporate reputation influences 
stakeholder decisions on whether that actor will want to associate or 
exchange with a particular corporation. A corporation’s reputation has 
significant consequences for its operations, including its ability to 
charge premium prices, recruit and retain employees, enjoy consumer 
loyalty, lower operating costs, and use its reputational capital to 
mitigate the risks to itself if and when a crisis strikes.67 
A corporate reputation is a product of what various stakeholders 
think about that corporation, but before stakeholders can form an 
 
 63. See, e.g., David L. Deephouse, Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An Integration 
of Mass Communication and Resource-Based Theories, 26 J. MGMT. 1091, 1093 (2000) (defining 
reputation as “the evaluation of a firm by its stakeholders in terms of their affect, esteem, and 
knowledge” and noting “[a] firm’s reputation is produced by the interactions of the firm with its 
stakeholders and by information about the firm and its actions circulated among stakeholders, 
including specialized information intermediaries”); Charles J. Fombrun, The Building Blocks of 
Corporate Reputation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 94, 100 
(Michael L. Barnett & Timothy G. Pollock eds., 2012) (“A corporate reputation is a collective 
assessment of a company’s attractiveness to a specific group of stakeholders relative to a reference 
group of companies with which the company competes for resources.”); E. Geoffrey Love & 
Matthew Kraatz, Character, Conformity, or the Bottom Line? How and Why Downsizing Affected 
Corporate Reputation, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 314, 314 (2009) (“Corporate reputation is an important 
asset (or liability) bestowed upon a firm by external audiences.”); Yuri Mishina, Emily S. Block 
& Michael J. Mannor, The Path Dependence of Organizational Reputation: How Social Judgment 
Influences Assessments of Capability & Character, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 459, 460 (2012) 
(“Organizational reputation is defined as the collective, stakeholder group-specific assessment 
regarding an organization’s capability to create value based on its characteristics and qualities.”).  
 64. CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE 
IMAGE 37 (1996).  
 65. Id. at 72. 
 66. Mishina et al., supra note 63, at 460. 
 67. FOMBRUN, supra note 64, at 72–73; Deephouse, supra note 63, at 1098; Charles Fombrun 
& Mark Shanley, What’s in a Name? Reputation Building and Corporate Strategy, 33 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 233, 233 (1990); Ronald Sims, Toward a Better Understanding of Organizational Efforts 
to Rebuild Reputation following an Ethical Scandal, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 453, 454–55 (2009). 
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impression of a corporation, they need information about it. 
Unfortunately, these stakeholders often face information problems 
that make it difficult to evaluate a corporation’s behavior or its 
products. These information problems are not unique to interactions 
with corporations, but also extend to our dealings with other types of 
organizations. 
The first hurdle stakeholders confront is the problem of 
information asymmetry between themselves and an organization. 
Organizations are often in a better position to collect, aggregate, and 
interpret information about themselves, but lack the incentives to 
share it, particularly if it is not in their interest to do so.68 
Even if stakeholders can get access to that information, they 
confront other issues that impede their ability to use that information 
productively. One issue is expertise and the capability to make sense 
of the information that an individual obtains about an organization. A 
second issue relates to the availability of too much information, which 
can overwhelm a consumer or other stakeholder. These issues do not 
concern the lack of access to information but, rather, unwillingness or 
inability to understand it.69 The information is out there but for a 
variety of reasons—time, inclination, and capability—we do not make 
use of it.70 
That is why we often rely on a variety of information 
intermediaries to reveal, disseminate, explain, and analyze information 
about organizations.71 Voters rely on their favorite news channels to 
recommend political parties, individuals rely on financial advisors to 
recommend investment companies, consumers rely on professional 
athletes to recommend automobile brands, and we even rely on 
celebrities to tell us what social causes are worth caring about. These 
are all information intermediaries who sift through the universe of 
available information and provide signals to us about the information 
 
 68. The NFL’s handling of information regarding brain injuries serves as an example. See 
supra note 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 69. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 687–90 (2011) (outlining the failure of mandated disclosure to influence 
stakeholders’ behavior due to the informational overload effect, especially in the credit and 
healthcare contexts). 
 70. See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1114–19 (2007) (discussing the limitations on the effectiveness of 
information-based regulation).  
 71. See Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
1, 9 (2015) (“[R]eputational sanctions in mass markets are largely determined by the 
interpretations and diffusion of information through intermediaries.”). 
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that is relevant and even the decisions that are correct. 
The same is true when it comes to information regarding 
corporations, including their performance, value, and character. 
Information intermediaries “enjoy lots of analytic resources and often 
have access to better information than ordinary constituents . . . . Their 
opinions significantly affect the way a company is regarded by its less-
informed observers.”72 The remainder of this Section discusses the 
information-enhancing effects of two important intermediaries: the 
courts and the media. Each of these intermediaries supplies 
stakeholders with both facts and narratives with which stakeholders 
can evaluate organizational conduct and construct organizational 
reputation.73 
We are accustomed to relying on courts for one type of 
information—legal norms—that tell us what to do and what happens 
when we do not.74 But the information produced from litigation also 
has significant factual value, informing the public what happened, why 
it happened, and, critically, if it can happen again.75 At times, we pay 
more attention to the courts’ abilities to determine facts about the 
world we live in—facts unknown to us or contested by ourselves and 
others—than the legal outcomes reached. Courts develop a factual 
record that is relevant to others besides the litigants. Courts produce 
factual information for public consumption in the form of pleadings, 
expert testimony, filed discovery, and judicial decisions.76 Not all these 
products result from a judge’s hand, yet the public tends to aggregate 
all these products under the common, sacrosanct umbrella of “the 
court.” That label is important because it accords information 
associated with it a special kind of authority, which begs the following 
question: when courts are one among many types of information 
intermediaries that can inform us of facts about the world we occupy, 
what is special about the information produced by the courts that 
makes us more willing to believe it? 
First, the courts can inform us of facts that we do not know and 
may not have any way of knowing but for the courts’ information 
 
 72. FOMBRUN, supra note 64, at 60. 
 73. See Timothy G. Pollock & Violina P. Rindova, Media Legitimation Effects in the Market 
for Initial Public Offerings, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 631, 631 (2003) (examining the impact of media 
on stakeholders’ evaluation of corporate reputations). 
 74. John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 998–1000 
(2014) (discussing top-down versus distributed forms of legal ordering).  
 75. Shapira, supra note 23, at 1201. 
 76. Goldstein, supra note 26, at 402. 
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disclosure; this is the information-forcing function of the courts.77 The 
rules of procedure, for example, empower private parties to obtain 
information they might not otherwise access but through the aid of the 
judicial power to command information disclosure.78 As such, courts 
and the information process generally are credible sources of 
information because they may be the exclusive source of that 
information. 
Second, even when litigation information is also available from 
other sources, the public often views litigation-related information as 
more credible; this is the information-transmission function of the 
courts. The information revealed through litigation is evaluated by a 
trusted class of opinion givers: judges.79 When parties file public 
pleadings designed to persuade, how is a layperson supposed to decide 
which version of events is more credible? We rely on the adversarial 
process to test the strength of each side’s arguments and the courts to 
parse the truth from competing sets of compelling narratives. Even if 
the media broke the story prior to a lawsuit, the release of information 
incidental to litigation allows stakeholders to reevaluate their initial 
assessment based on the checks provided by the litigation process and 
thereby to calibrate their reputational judgments of organizational 
behavior.80 
However reliable of an information intermediary the courts are, 
information from the courts does not make its way directly to 
individual awareness. We are all strapped for time and mental energy, 
and there is a lot of information that comes our way during the course 
of a day. Most people are not going to wade through dense, lengthy 
legal pleadings or judicial opinions. Instead, we learn about legal news 
as we learn about most other news: someone tells us. 
We rely on other information intermediaries to inform us of legal 
developments and explain their significance. One prominent 
information intermediary of legal information is the media, at least in 
part because it is free or significantly less costly than legal counsel, itself 
 
 77. Lahav, supra note 23, at 1683.  
 78. See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 402 (noting the public reliance on the courts to expose 
wrongdoing).  
 79. Bradt & Rave, supra note 21, at 1264–65 (discussing the unique capabilities of MDL 
judges that qualify them to act as information intermediaries, including coordinating exchange of 
information, deciding information-intensive motions, and access to experts); Shapira, supra note 
71, at 12 (describing judges as providing a “second-opinion” on information produced during 
litigation). 
 80. See Shapira, supra note 71, at 13. 
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another information intermediary of legal news. Specialized media 
sources communicate, explain, and frame legal proceedings for 
audiences who are reluctant to read a pleading or judicial opinion for 
themselves.81 As such, litigation-related information passes through 
two levels of intermediaries—court intermediary and media 
intermediary—before it reaches the stakeholder. 
Like the courts, the media also possesses unique qualities that 
influence how individuals perceive the information it shares and, 
consequently, stakeholders’ views on organizations. Specifically, the 
media serves an important agenda-setting function whereby “[t]he day-
to-day selection and display of news by journalists focuses the public’s 
attention and influences its perceptions. The specific ability to 
influence the salience of both topics and their images among the public 
has come to be called the agenda-setting role of the news media.”82 The 
media’s coverage of an organization and its activities contributes to the 
public agenda because “the prominence of elements in the news 
influences the prominence of those elements among the public.”83 
The process of agenda setting begins with the attention that the 
media accords a particular organization and its activities or products.84 
Through cues such as the length of a story or its frequency, the public 
will decide which organizations’ behavior most warrants their 
attention.85 But the media does not stop there. It also provides a filter 
through which the public associates the organization with a set of 
attributes.86 This is the affective component of media coverage that 
relates to tone and feeling about various organizations and influences 
the perception of organizations: “By calling attention to some matters 
 
 81. For example, national newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post, 
devote sections of their publications to legal developments. Certain journalists devote their 
careers to only covering the courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court. Television personalities 
also explain legal developments for their audiences. Even lawyers obtain legal news through trade 
publications, professional newsletters, and firm bulletins. 
 82. Craig E. Carroll & Maxwell McCombs, Agenda-Setting Effects of Business News on the 
Public’s Images and Opinions About Major Corporations, 6 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 36, 36 
(2003).  
 83. Id. at 36–37; Pollock & Rindova, supra note 73, at 632 (“Therefore, in performing its 
functions of informing, highlighting, and framing, the media presents market participants with 
information that affects impression formation and the legitimation of firms.”).  
 84. See Carroll & McCombs, supra note 82, at 37 (noting the effect of media attention on the 
perceived salience of the subject to stakeholders). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id.; Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 733–36 (1999) (discussing the ways that interest groups feed information to 
media outlets in order to increase the salience of an issue).  
PARELLA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2018  11:31 PM 
926  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:907 
while ignoring others, the news media influences the criteria by which 
presidents, government policies, political candidates and corporations 
are judged.”87 
The agenda-setting function interacts with litigation information 
disclosure in interesting ways. Although litigation may release initial 
facts into the public space, those facts may be ignored unless a media 
intermediary picks up those facts and amplifies it to an audience.88 
Even if we hear the facts, we are not usually very good at processing 
those facts without a narrative. Legal pleadings create factual 
narratives but not necessarily the types of narratives that are salient to 
a lay audience. The media helps the general public learn and digest 
information elicited by the legal process. The public can then use that 
information to encourage organizational change, the process of which 
will be described in the next Section. 
B. The Process of Influencing Organizational Change: Priming, 
Pivoting, and Positioning 
In contrast to the organizational reform strategies explained in 
Part I.A, reputational regulation relies on reputational sanctions to 
incentivize organizations to change. 
This is not new. Social movement theorists shared the benefits of 
litigation publicity for encouraging organizational change by driving 
the defendant organization to the negotiating table in order to reach a 
settlement,89 educate the public on a cause,90 secure funding and other 
resources for the plaintiff organizations,91 and construct a social 
movement’s organizational identity, including motivating its 
members.92 Both social movements theory and reputational regulation 
are less court-centered than traditional litigation because both 
approaches use legal processes to achieve extralegal objectives rather 
 
 87. See Carroll & McCombs, supra note 82, at 37. 
 88. See Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 487. 
 89. See Chiang, supra note 10, at 79 (“[S]haming can be used to close gaps between existing 
doctrine and the desired reform by serving as an added source of pressure for defendants to come 
to the bargaining table when plaintiffs’ purely legal entitlements may not otherwise be 
sufficient.”). 
 90. See Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 481–82 (providing examples of 
how “political movements have used courts to further public debate on important constitutional 
issues”). 
 91. HANDLER, supra note 36, at 216. 
 92. NeJaime, supra note 36, at 972–86. 
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than relying on legal remedies to achieve the social objectives desired.93 
Both analyses also reveal the productive social benefits of legal 
processes that, upon initial evaluation, “fail” to produce legal solutions 
to organizational misconduct.94 
Under reputational regulation, organizational change depends on 
the particular institutional vulnerabilities of the organizations at issue. 
Specifically, reputational sanctions can be used to influence 
organizational change: stakeholders wield those sanctions to deny an 
organization access to a resource that it values unless that organization 
demonstrates change to those withholding the relevant resources.95 
The denial of resources and the proof of change are attenuated; the 
parties involved may never occupy the same room or even meet. They 
signal each other through media fora as one set of parties 
communicates the consequences of poor organizational behavior and 
another set of parties responds with proof of their redemption. 
Publicity increases pressure on organizations to change but does 
not by itself determine the types of changes that the organization 
adopts; those desiring change must not only incentivize organizations 
to change but to change for the better. For example, social movements 
theorists explained that one advantage of litigation publicity is that it 
brings the organization to the negotiation table to settle on 
organizational change strategies with other stakeholders.96  
In contrast, reputational regulation influences the way that 
organizations change by priming, pivoting, and positioning.97 Priming 
refers to the creation of conditions that make an organization willing 
to undertake institutional change. Pivoting occurs when an 
organization fosters closer ties to one organization while 
simultaneously cutting its ties to another. Positioning describes the 
institutional constraints that an organization confronts when it tries to 
change its identity to appear more legitimate to the public’s perception. 
 
 93. See HANDLER, supra note 36, at 192 (describing the use of the legal system for 
“nontraditional” purposes). 
 94. NeJaime, supra note 36, at 1002–11. 
 95. Craig Deegan, Introduction: The Legitimising Effect of Social and Environmental 
Disclosures; a Theoretical Foundation, 15 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 282, 293 
(2002) (“[L]egitimacy theory would suggest that whenever managers consider that the supply of 
the particular resource is vital to organizational survival, then they will pursue strategies to ensure 
the continued supply of that resource.”).  
 96. HANDLER, supra note 36, at 214; Chiang, supra note 36, at 106–07. 
 97. Kishanthi Parella, The Information Regulation of Business Actors, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 
130, 130 (2017). 
PARELLA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2018  11:31 PM 
928  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:907 
This stage of organizational change is called positioning because it 
involves an identity struggle that plants an organization on a spectrum 
between two poles, representing the identity it desires and the identity 
it fears; positioning is about the institutional constraints created by this 
identity struggle.98 
Priming incentivizes an organization to change. For example, 
litigation discloses information about an organization’s attributes and 
fosters legitimacy crises for the affected organization. These processes 
serve a priming function by rendering that organization more willing 
to change. By its very function, priming necessitates a subsequent 
action: we prime in anticipation of some future act. When litigation 
primes organizations, it is setting up that organization to take some 
further act by reducing its resistance to change. Priming only affects 
the susceptibility or willingness of an organization to change; it does 
not guarantee that the change will be a socially desired one. That is why 
it is also important to pivot. 
Pivoting occurs when an organization tries to copy one 
organization while simultaneously attempting to distinguish itself from 
another. Although pivoting is voluntary, litigation creates conditions 
for pivoting. Industry actors often pivot when they confront a 
legitimacy crisis created or exacerbated by litigation. They distance 
themselves from organizations that further jeopardize their legitimacy 
while pivoting toward organizations that could enhance their 
legitimacy.99 
Pivoting is a product of isomorphism, which explains why 
organizations tend to resemble each other in their policies, practices, 
and other operational features.100 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell’s 
classic study of isomorphism explained that organizations adopt 
particular policies, programs, and techniques of other organizations in 
order to improve their legitimacy, deal with uncertainty, or satisfy 
societal expectations.101 These are all examples of isomorphic 
attraction because their analysis generally describes situations when 
organizations change to resemble each other. 
 
 98. Id. at 132. 
 99. Deegan, supra note 95, at 293. 
 100. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 65–66 (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991); 
see John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth 
and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340–41 (1977). 
 101. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 100, at 67–77. 
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In contrast is isomorphic repulsion, which describes situations 
when organizations change their practices to differentiate or distance 
themselves from another organization. This distancing can include 
creating new identities, adopting new practices, and forging alliances 
with other actors. The key point is that organizations not only change 
their practices to look more like some organizations but also to look 
less like others. At times, an isomorphic repulsive force may be 
stronger than an organization’s isomorphic attraction to another 
organization; therefore, isomorphic repulsion may better predict and 
explain organizational change in those circumstances. Isomorphic 
attraction and repulsion can explain the forms of organizational change 
by illustrating why and when an organization will copy or distance itself 
from another. 
Pivoting is important because the organizations toward which a 
scrutinized organization pivots may have limited ability to influence 
the organization otherwise. A pivoting organization may borrow 
institutional practices from the organization it is pivoting toward but 
may not do so without a legitimacy crisis motivating it. Outside actors 
are limited in their ability to command an organization to incorporate 
and enforce the nonbinding institutional rules of multistakeholder 
initiatives, nongovernmental organization (NGO) guidelines, or other 
unenforceable institutional rules.102 But while these organizations lack 
coercive capability they do possess an important resource: 
legitimacy.103 When, therefore, an organization’s legitimacy is tainted 
by the reputational effects of litigation, the organization is more likely 
to pivot toward these noncoercive organizations in order to enhance its 
own legitimacy.104 For example, following a public crisis, a 
transnational corporation may willingly adopt the nonbinding rules of 
a respected international organization, such as the United Nations 
(UN), even though it is not legally obligated to do so.105 The 
corporation adopts these nonbinding rules because the crisis has 
damaged its reputation, and it seeks to repair its image by forging 
 
 102. Parella, supra note 97 at 131–32. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Bitektine, supra note 30, at 86 (“[W]hen two organizations are linked through a 
transaction, partnership or public endorsement, the legitimacy ‘flows’ through such a link from 
the more legitimate to a less legitimate organization.”); Parella, supra note 97 at 131–32 (arguing 
that noncoercive organizations’ legitimacy induces business actors to turn to them when 
confronted with a legitimacy crisis).  
 105. Parella, supra note 97, at 132. 
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closer ties to another organization that is better respected.106 
Positioning is the last step, and it refers to the institutional 
constraints created by an identity struggle when an organization tries 
to distance itself from its old identity and solidify its new one. This is 
distinguishable from pivoting, which directs organizations to the actors 
from whom it will borrow institutional practices. The information 
produced by media-litigation intermediaries can trigger an identity 
struggle for an organization if the information revealed presents an 
image of the organization that differs from the organization’s desired 
public image. This identity struggle has two consequences for 
organizational behavior. First, organizations will adopt practices that 
lead them to resemble the desired identity and appear less like the 
feared one. Second, organizations often pursue their desired identity 
by distinguishing themselves from other organizations they cast as “the 
enemy.” By labeling other actors as the enemy, organizations change 
their practices to differentiate themselves from those others so the 
public can distinguish between the two. 
Our legal institutions can encourage organizations to change in a 
number of ways. While court orders and DPAs can directly contribute 
to change, the reputational effects of litigation and prosecution can 
indirectly encourage organizations to change. These processes create 
informational effects that are amplified by media coverage. 
The combination of priming, pivoting, and positioning through 
identity struggles illustrates how the information effects produced by 
legal institutions can provide indirect mechanisms for encouraging 
organizational change. 
II.  REPUTATIONAL SANCTIONS IN PRACTICE 
The information conveyed by both media and legal intermediaries 
are processed by different stakeholder groups, including consumers, 
investors, communities, and employees. These stakeholders translate 
the information from media and legal intermediaries into reputational 
consequences for an organization—consequences that incentivize 
these organizations to change. 
This Part analyzes four distinct but related reputational incentives 
for organizational change: financial, regulatory spillover, barriers to 
entry, and policy. These incentives do not necessarily operate in 
isolation but often work in combination to encourage organizations to 
 
 106. Id. 
PARELLA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2018  11:31 PM 
2018] REPUTATIONAL REGULATION 931 
change. Consequently, the case illustrations below demonstrate 
multiple, overlapping incentives at work, but they have been organized 
to draw the reader’s attention to the operation of one incentive per 
case illustration. This Article highlights incentives independently in 
order to identify and explain the unique mechanisms of each incentive 
and thus understand its particular contribution to organizational 
change. 
The case illustrations selected are as follows: the FIFA 
investigation illustrates the financial incentive, the Wells Fargo fine 
describes regulatory spillover, the civil suits against Uber demonstrate 
barrier to entry, and the climate change treaty is exemplar of the 
policy-based incentive. The case illustrations were selected based on 
the following factors: (a) immediacy of events, (b) extent of media 
coverage for depth of background information, (c) diversity of media 
sources for comprehensiveness of information, and (d) litigation or 
governmental investigation or inquiry. Two of the case illustrations 
concern events that qualified for Fortune’s annual list of “Top Five 
Corporate Scandals” for 2015 and 2016.107 The other case illustrations 
may not have commanded significant media attention by themselves, 
but they occurred in the shadow of significant political and industry 
developments over the past two years. 
A. Financial Sanctions: “Naming and Shaming” 
The most well-known reputational consequence for an 
organization facing bad publicity is a financial penalty levied by 
consumers or investors. In consumer markets, reputational 
consequences harm an organization’s bottom line when consumers 
boycott products. In order to regain consumers, organizations will 
change their behavior. Investors also use shareholder proposals 
advocating organizational changes to address nonfinancial risks, such 
as those relating to the environment or human rights.108 Therefore, 
 
 107. Chris Matthews & Stephen Gandel, The 5 Biggest Corporate Scandals of 2015, FORTUNE 
(Dec. 27, 2015, 10:47 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/12/27/biggest-corporate-scandals-2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q962-DNK5] (listing the FIFA scandal); Chris Matthews & Matthew Heimer, 
The 5 Biggest Corporate Scandals of 2016, FORTUNE (Dec. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), 
http://fortune.com/2016/12/28/biggest-corporate-scandals-2016/ [https://perma.cc/8TTG-XCKZ] 
(listing the Wells Fargo scandal at the top of the list). 
 108. See, e.g., BIMAL PATEL, ROBERT KALB, ANDREW BOREK & RYAN PHILLIPS, 
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2015 UNITED STATES PROXY SEASON REVIEW – 
GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS 2 (2015) (“The number of governance-related shareholder proposals 
that appeared on ballots in the first half of each respective year has skyrocketed, from 172 in 2014 
to 238 in 2015, reflecting a breakout year for proxy access proposals.”); Victoria Harper Ho, Risk-
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financial consequences can compromise access to capital and revenue 
depending on the stakeholder exercising the leverage. The financial 
pressure leads organizations to adopt changes in order to appease the 
concerns of these stakeholders and to keep them as exchange partners. 
The case study below explains how financial pressure from 
corporate sponsors incentivized FIFA to adopt internal reforms in 
2016. It focuses on the financial incentives that encouraged this 
organizational change because, though FIFA is not new to scandal, the 
reforms are new. Although it is challenging to draw lines of direct 
causation, two factors distinguish FIFA’s most recent corruption 
scandal from the rest of its tainted history. First, a number of former 
FIFA officials are under government investigation by U.S. 
authorities.109 Second, and relatedly, FIFA experienced a significant 
financial crisis as corporate sponsors threatened to withdraw because 
of FIFA’s tarnished reputation.110 FIFA’s leadership saw internal 
reform as a way to win sponsors back and attract new ones.111 As such, 
this case illustration is used to describe financial incentives in practice, 
but in reality, the regulatory incentive through Department of Justice 
(DOJ) investigation also played a significant role. 
1. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).  FIFA 
is the international governing body for organized soccer, which makes 
billions of dollars from media, marketing rights, ticket sales to World 
Cup championships, and corporate sponsorships.112 FIFA is organized 
under Swiss association law and currently has 209 member associations 
globally.113 Each of these associations represents the football 
federation of a particular nation or territory.114 These associations 
comprise the legislative body of FIFA, the FIFA Congress.115 
Additionally, each of these associations is a member of one of the six 
 
Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 690 
(2016) (“During the 2014 proxy season, investors filed 148 climate-related resolutions, a 50 
percent increase over 2013.”). 
 109. See infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 110. See infra notes 122–30 and accompanying text. 
 111. See infra notes 128–37 and accompanying text. 
 112. Virginia Harrison, How FIFA Makes Its Billions, CNN MONEY (May 27, 2015, 12:17 PM) 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/27/news/fifa-corruption-profit/ [https://perma.cc/NQM4-6W5E]. 
 113. Victim Statement & Request for Restitution at 4, United States v. Hawit, No. 15-cr-252 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015), ECF No. 102. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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continental confederations.116 
In May 2015, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern 
District of New York announced charges against several high-ranking 
officials of FIFA and of “other soccer governing bodies that operate 
under the FIFA umbrella.”117 The officials were charged with 
“racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracies, among 
other offenses, in connection with [the defendants’] participation in a 
24-year scheme to enrich themselves through the corruption of 
international soccer.”118 By December 2015, the DOJ had charged a 
total of forty-one individuals and organizations as part of its FIFA 
investigation.119 
The U.S. investigation fostered a legitimacy crisis for FIFA that 
grew into a financial crisis, which created an environment conducive 
for internal reform within FIFA.120 While FIFA’s checkered history 
may have been public knowledge, DOJ’s announcement of its 
investigations into FIFA created a unique legitimacy crisis because the 
information about FIFA’s misconduct was revealed by trusted 
intermediaries—government actors—who signaled that they were 
going to do something about the misconduct. The investigations into 
FIFA tarnished its public image, which then fueled a financial crisis 
that compounded the pressure for organizational reform. In 2015, 
FIFA’s deficit exceeded $100 million, due to withdrawn corporate 
sponsorships and legal costs associated with the various national 
investigations.121 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted 
for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption (May 27, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and [https://
perma.cc/6R5E-Z9UK]. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Sixteen Additional FIFA Officials Indicted For Racketeering, 
Conspiracy And Corruption (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/sixteen-
additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and-corruption [https://perma.cc/Q747-
879A] (“FIFA and its six continental confederations – including CONCACAF, headquartered in 
the United States, and CONMEBOL, the confederation headquartered in South America – 
together with affiliated regional federations, national member associations and sports marketing 
companies, constitute an enterprise of legal entities associated in fact for purposes of violating the 
federal racketeering laws.”). 
 120. FIFA, 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT 1 (2015), https://resources.fifa.com/ 
mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/74/17/54/2015.11.27finalreport_forpublicatio
n_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW2U-DZDC] (“FIFA is currently going through the worst crisis 
of its history.”).  
 121. Brian Homewood, FIFA Faces $108 Million Deficit for 2015 -Finance Overseer, 
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2016) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fifa-finance/fifa-faces-108-
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Throughout 2015, FIFA’s corporate sponsors withdrew en masse. 
As early as January of that year, Castrol, Continental, Johnson & 
Johnson, Sony, and Emirates had already announced the end of their 
sponsorships, raising concerns that FIFA had become “toxic.”122 
Sponsorship further declined following the United States attorney 
general’s May 2015 announcement of criminal charges against FIFA 
officials. Visa threatened to withdraw altogether, and Coca-Cola and 
Adidas also called for FIFA to address its internal issues.123 Comedian 
John Oliver added his own incentive for corporate withdrawal, offering 
to endorse products of FIFA corporate sponsors that withdrew their 
support of then-FIFA President Sepp Blatter.124 
By the end of 2015, twenty-seven of FIFA’s thirty-four corporate 
sponsorship slots were unfilled, with media reporting that “[t]he 
 
million-deficit-for-2015-finance-overseer-idUSKCN0VY2UK [https://perma.cc/CGE5-8VAQ]; 
Rebecca R. Ruiz, FIFA’s Financial Disclosures Show That Scandal Has Affected Its Bottom Line, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/sports/soccer/fifas-financial-
disclosures-show-that-scandal-has-affected-its-bottom-line.html [https://perma.cc/KT65-7YKG] 
(reporting FIFA had spent $62 million in legal fees); Press Ass’n, Fifa Suffers £67m Loss After 
Crisis Takes Its Toll on Governing Body, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2015), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/football/2015/ dec/02/fifa-67m-loss-crisis-governing-body [https://perma. 
cc/52HN-JR3Q].  
 122. Ben Rumsby, Fifa Loses Three Key Sponsors as Castrol, Continental and Johnson & 




 123. Adam Withnall, Fifa Key Sponsors Visa, Adidas and Coca-Cola Pile on Pressure in Wake 
of Corruption Scandal, INDEPENDENT (May 27, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/europe/fifa-key-sponsors-visa-adidas-and-coca-cola-pile-on-pressure-in-wake-of-
corruption-scandal-10280496.html [https://perma.cc/4QB4-9TKF]. Coca-Cola took an even more 
active role months later when it called upon FIFA President Sepp Blatter to resign immediately. 
Coca-Cola and other corporate sponsors issued their demand the week after Blatter was placed 
under criminal investigation by Swiss authorities. Malcolm Moore, Fifa Sponsors Forced to Act 
with Call for Blatter To Go, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/7be415ca-6aaf-
11e5-8171-ba1968cf791a [https://perma.cc//GA6H-G2C4]. 
 124. On May 31, 2015, John Oliver, host of HBO’s Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, made 
the following plea to FIFA’s corporate sponsors:  
Please make Sepp Blatter go away. I will do anything. Adidas, I will wear one of your 
ugly shoes. . . . McDonald’s, I’ll take a bite out of every item on your dollar menu. . . . 
Budweiser, if you pull your support and help get rid of Blatter, I will put my mouth 
where my mouth is . . . and I will even drink a Bud Light Lime. 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television broadcast May 31, 2015); LastWeekTonight, 
FIFA II: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO) (June 1, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=qr6ar3xJL_Q. On June 7, following Blatter’s resignation announcement, Oliver kept his 
promises to the sponsors on air. Last Week Tonight (HBO television broadcast June 7, 2015); 
1nacho566, John Oliver Keeps His Promise After Blatter’s Resignation (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Csi_BEgL_U.  
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corruption scandal has proved so toxic that no new sponsors have 
joined since the 2014 World Cup.”125 The year ended with Coca-Cola, 
Adidas, McDonald’s, Visa, and AB Inbev sending an open letter to the 
FIFA Executive Committee demanding significant cultural change to 
reflect “[t]ransparency, accountability, respect for human rights, 
integrity, leadership and gender equality.”126 
The criminal investigations and the resulting financial sanctions 
caused FIFA to experience “the worst crisis of its history” and suffer 
significant damage to its reputation.127 FIFA’s leadership delivered dire 
warnings about what might occur if the FIFA Congress rejected 
reform. Acting President of FIFA Issa Hayatou warned that FIFA’s 
existence “[may be] at risk.”128 FIFA’s new president, Gianni Infantino, 
stated that “[i]t is now or never for [FIFA] to embrace change and to 
bring football back to the heart of [FIFA].”129 FIFA recognized that “in 
order to restore confidence in FIFA, significant modifications to its 
institutional structure and operational processes are necessary to 
prevent corruption, fraud, self-dealing and to make the organisation 
more transparent and accountable.”130 
The financial pressure exerted by the corporate sponsors helped 
prime FIFA for reform, but so did the information revealed by the 
criminal investigations into FIFA’s officials. The investigations by the 
DOJ not only provided information to the public that resulted in 
reputational sanctions but also created a background enforcement 
threat.131 For example, the British newspaper The Guardian reported 
that “[FIFA] insiders are desperate for the reforms to pass, fearing that 
US prosecutors could reconsider the governing body’s ‘victim’ status 
 
 125. Press Ass’n, New Sponsors Are not Committing to Fifa Until New President Is Elected, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/04/fifa-sponsors- 
[https://perma.cc/E6S4-ASEB].  
 126. Open Letter to the FIFA Executive Committee, COCA-COLA COMPANY (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://www.coca-colacompany.com/press-center/company-statements/open-letter-to-the-fifa-
executive-committee [https://perma.cc/KDZ3-HT7Y].  
 127. FIFA, supra note 120, at 1. 
 128. Owen Gibson, Fifa’s Existence at Risk if Reforms Are Rejected, Warns Issa Hayatou, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/feb/25/fifa-reforms-issa-
hayatou [https://perma.cc/23LZ-V5B6]. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Open Letter to the FIFA Executive Committee, supra note 126. 
 131. Pa Sport, FIFA Members Vote To Back Reforms Package at Extraordinary Congress, 
ESPN (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.espnfc.us/blog/fifa/243/ post/2815643/fifa-members-vote-to-
back-reforms-package [https://perma.cc/9CXK-LPSW] (“The governing body’s lawyers hope the 
reforms will show U.S. prosecutors that it is serious about changing its culture.”). 
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in the continuing prosecutions if they do not.”132 
This threat was not only relevant for FIFA officials but also for 
corporate sponsors who feared that the reputational contamination 
and risk of investigation might spread to them as well.133 As a result, 
the criminal investigations provided necessary pressure for both 
organizational reform and stakeholder (sponsor) pressure for reform. 
In February 2016, 179 of the 209 members of FIFA’s legislative 
body approved a historic reform package.134 The reforms included clear 
separation between officials’ “political” and management functions; 
term limits for the FIFA President, FIFA Council (previously FIFA 
Executive Committee) members, members of the Audit and 
Compliance Committee, and members of the judicial bodies; greater 
scrutiny and supervision over the election of FIFA Council members; 
and disclosure of high-ranking FIFA officials’ compensation.135 FIFA 
also amended its governing statute to reflect these reforms.136 
FIFA portrayed its 2016 reform package as a response to 
corporate sponsors’ concerns regarding its recent reputational crisis 
and internal organizational issues. In its report, the Reform Committee 
explicitly stated that it “engaged with the commercial partners of 
FIFA, in particular, FIFA’s primary sponsors, and has carefully 
listened to their views on the subject of FIFA reform.”137 
The investigations and ensuing financial crisis did not merely 
 
 132. Gibson, supra note 128. 
 133. Joe Leahy & Mark Odell, Fifa Corruption Scandal Threatens to Engulf Nike as Sponsors 
Raise Pressure, FIN. TIMES (May 29, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/06d28cd0-055b-11e5-
bb7d-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/2SHR-BTUW]; Christopher M. Matthews, Aruna 
Viswanatha & Joe Flint, U.S. Considers Role of Banks, Sponsors in Soccer Bribery Probe, WALL 
STREET J. (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-considers-role-of-banks-sponsors-in-
soccer-bribery-probe-1460937132 [https://perma.cc/5U94-WVTD] (“U.S. authorities’ focus now 
has shifted to the relationships between sports-marketing firms and the companies to whom they 
sold media and sponsorship rights . . . .”); Ben McLanahan, Sponsors Step up Pressure on FIFA 
over Corruption Probe, FIN. TIMES (May 28, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/16f465ac-04bb-
11e5-adaf-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/2DXX-U9T2] (“Adidas must be careful that its Fifa 
sponsorship does not become a reputational risk and damage its brand.”); id. (explaining that 
Sony had permitted its long-term $305 million contract to expire in December 2015 and that 
“Sony officials had previously expressed concerns about the widening allegations and the group’s 
association with Fifa”).  
 134. Press Release, FIFA, FIFA Congress Approves Landmark Reforms (Feb. 26, 2016), 
http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2016/m=2/news=fifa-congress-approves-landmark-
reforms-2767108.html [https://perma.cc/EQ5H-6CJU]. 
 135. The Reform Process, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifa-works/the-reform-
process.html [https://perma.cc/KUA4-6M4J]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. FIFA, supra note 120, at 1.  
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prime FIFA for organizational change. The crises also created the 
conditions for FIFA to borrow practices from other organizations that 
could introduce meaningful structural reform in certain operational 
areas. For example, FIFA pivoted toward the UN by requesting that 
the former UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, 
John Ruggie, recommend strategies for how it could embed better 
human rights norms throughout its operation.138 It also requested 
technical assistance from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.139 FIFA may not have pivoted toward the UN on its 
own; instead, the criminal investigations primed FIFA to pivot by 
creating a legitimacy crisis where FIFA would want to foster ties to 
organizations with greater legitimacy, such as the UN, and cut ties with 
actors who further jeopardize its legitimacy, like the defendants in the 
DOJ investigation. 
By pivoting toward the UN to enhance its own legitimacy, FIFA 
set itself up to borrow practices from that organization.140 Outside 
actors would have limited ability to command FIFA to abide by UN 
human rights practices; the reputational consequences following the 
DOJ investigation created the conditions for pivoting that led FIFA to 
a similar path. 
B. Regulatory Sanctions vis-a-vis the Spillover Effect: The Tragedy of 
the Reputational Commons 
Information disclosure from media, courts, and prosecutors does 
not only affect the organization making headlines or the one named in 
the complaint. Instead, this information can also have significant 
negative consequences for the broader industry because of spillover 
effects. Consider the examples of—and your reaction to—BP, VW, and 
Enron. Our instinctual reaction to these names and the industries they 
represent illustrates how an organization’s reputation is 
interconnected with the reputation of its industry peers. As a result, 
“reputations are ‘intangible commons’ because organizations share 
both the penalties and rewards associated with the reputations of their 
industries.”141 
 
 138. Press Release, FIFA, Report by Harvard Expert Professor Ruggie to Support 
Development of FIFA’s Human Rights Policies (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.fifa.com/governance/ 
news/y=2016/m=4/news=report-by-harvard-expert-professor-ruggie-to-support-development-of-
fi-2781111.html [https://perma.cc/9Z98-C78H]; Parella, supra note 97, at 132. 
 139. FIFA, supra note 138. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Lori Qingyuan Yue & Paul Ingram, Industry Self-Regulation as a Solution to the 
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The risk of reputational spillover is most acute when organizations 
in the same industry are homogenous; their similarities inhibit the 
ability of stakeholders to differentiate one actor from the rest of the 
industry.142 “[T]he act of any individual firm is more likely to be judged 
characteristic of the potential of all such firms.”143 As a consequence, 
revelations of misconduct by one industry actor can place the entire 
industry under scrutiny by stakeholders, who are now on notice of 
particular risks.144 Organizational scholars have observed reputational 
spillover effects in industries as diverse as oil and gas, diamonds, 
apparel, chemicals, and cinema.145 
Spillover effects can cause both financial and regulatory 
consequences for industry peers—and not all these consequences are 
bad. The spillover effect can have positive consequences on industry 
peers because the homogeneity between the shamed firm and its 
industry peers increases substitution possibilities between the two for 
consumers or investors: one firm’s loss is another firm’s gain.146 For 
example, consumers angered by Apple’s human rights practices can 
purchase a Samsung phone instead. Here, perceived homogeneity 
between firms is a financial advantage for peers in the same industry, 
although that same perception is a disadvantage for the shamed firm 
that loses out to substitution. 
 
Reputation Commons Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION, 
supra note 63, at 278, 279; see also Michael L. Barnett & Andrew J. Hoffman, Beyond Corporate 
Reputation: Managing Reputational Interdependence, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 1, 2 (2008) 
(stating that firms can both profit and be hurt by the reputation of their industry). 
 142. See Michael L. Barnett, Finding a Working Balance Between Competitive and Communal 
Strategies, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1753, 1763 (2006) (“[T]he more numerous, distant, and 
heterogeneous are the members of an organizational field, the less intense is any reputation 
commons problem likely to be.” (citing Andrew A. King, Michael J. Lenox & Michael L. Barnett, 
Strategic Responses to the Reputation Commons Problem, in ORGANIZATIONS, POLICY AND THE 
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONAL AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 393 (Andrew J. 
Hoffman & Marc J. Ventresca eds., 2002))). 
 143. Id.; see also Michael L Barnett & Andrew A. King, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: 
A Longitudinal Analysis of an Industry Self-Regulatory Institutions, 51 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1150, 
1152 (2008) (“[W]hen one firm’s actions influence the judgments observers make of another firm 
or an industry as a whole, a commons arises. This reputation commons intertwines the fates of 
firms in an industry because all firms suffer when any firm engages in actions that damage the 
industry’s shared reputation.”); Sheila Goins & Thomas S. Gruca, Understanding Competitive and 
Contagion Effects of Layoff Announcements, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 12, 30 (2008); Yue & 
Ingram, supra note 141, at 280 (stating that reputations of organizations are interdependent). 
 144. Yue & Ingram, supra note 141, at 280. 
 145. Id. at 281. 
 146. See Goins & Gruca, supra note 143, at 16–17 (explaining the competitive effects of 
information on rival firms). 
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Spillover effects can also give rise to regulatory consequences for 
industry peers. The same perceived homogeneity that increases the 
likelihood of positive financial spillover effects via substitution also 
increases the likelihood of regulatory spillover effects as government 
actors, usually in response to public outrage, broaden the scope of their 
inquiry to encompass the entire industry instead of just focusing on the 
conduct of an individual organization. In this climate, organizations 
may use new institutional initiatives or organizational changes to 
manage their public perception and regulatory risk.147 
The following case illustration discusses the consumer fraud 
scandal of Wells Fargo. This case illustration demonstrates the 
interaction of two incentives: financial and regulatory. Although the 
story begins by demonstrating the financial consequences of 
reputational sanctions, the case illustration then discusses the 
reputational spillover effect of the Wells Fargo scandal on its banking 
peers and the effect of regulatory risk. The example focuses on the 
regulatory spillover effects instead of the financial spillover effects 
because the former better explains the organizational changes 
witnessed within the banking sector. The example highlights how 
scandal and spillover effects contributed to a heightened regulatory 
climate for executive compensation in the banking sector, and how 
certain actors within this sector considered proactive organizational 
changes regarding executive compensation in order to address this 
regulatory risk. 
1. The Wells Fargo Sham Account Scandal.  Wells Fargo emerged 
from the 2008 financial crisis with its reputation relatively intact 
compared to other major banks.148 That status changed rapidly in 
September 2016 when the CFPB fined Wells Fargo $100 million plus 
$85 million in additional penalties for engaging in aggressive sales 
tactics through which employees created up to two million fake 
accounts in order to meet internal sales quotas.149 
 
 147. See, e.g., John W. Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon & Steven C. Hackett, Self-Regulation and 
Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583, 613 
(2000) (concluding that corporations are more likely to engage in voluntary self-regulation as 
political pressure and the threat of formal regulation increases). 
 148. Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Steps Down, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 12, 
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-ceo-stumpf-to-retire-1476306019 [https://perma. 
cc/8YFL-TH3G]. 
 149. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 17 (“Spurred by sales targets and compensation 
incentives, employees boosted sales figures by covertly opening accounts and funding them by 
transferring funds from consumers’ authorized accounts without their knowledge or consent, 
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The fine against Wells Fargo was the largest fine the CFPB had 
ever imposed.150 But despite its size, the fine represents a small fraction 
of the financial fallout Wells Fargo suffered as a result of the scandal, 
which is consistent with empirical research indicating that 
“reputational losses for financial misconduct exceed the explicit 
penalties imposed by either public or private enforcement agents.”151 
The fine created secondary reputational consequences that levied 
another wave of financial consequences for Wells Fargo.152 For 
example, a study conducted in October 2016 by management 
consulting firm cg42 predicted that “Wells Fargo will lose $99 [billion] 
in deposits and $4 [billion] in revenue over the next 12-18 months as a 
direct result of the scandal.”153 The study’s authors attributed this 
financial loss to consumers’ desire to switch banks, with the study 
finding that 30 percent of those surveyed reported they are considering 
alternatives and another 14 percent already resolved to switch because 
of the scandal.154 Some states, such as Illinois and Ohio, also pulled 
 
often racking up fees or other charges.”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Jonathan M. Karpoff, Does Reputation Work To Discipline Corporate Misconduct?, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION, supra note 63, at 361, 376. Companies 
often experience market sanctions that exceed government penalties when the conduct concerns 
corporate fraud. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms 
Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON., 757, 758 (1993)(“[W]e present evidence 
that the reputational cost of corporate fraud is large and constitutes most of the cost incurred by 
firms accused or convicted of fraud.”); see also Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. 
Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 
(2008) (stating that in cases involving financial misrepresentation, “[t]he reputation loss exceeds 
the legal penalty by over 7.5 times, and it exceeds the amount by which firm value was artificially 
inflated by more than 2.5 times”). 
 152. In another example, proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services 
recommended in April 2017 that shareholders of Wells Fargo vote against 12 of the 15 members 
of Wells Fargo’s board. Emily Glazer, Proxy Advisory Firm ISS Suggests Wells Fargo 
Shareholders Vote Against 12 of 15 Directors, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 7, 2017), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-advisory-firm-iss-suggests-wells-fargo-shareholders-vote-against-
12-of-15-directors-1491579277 [https://perma.cc/6UEG-WLEH]. 
 153. CG42, supra note 18, at 3.  
 154. Id.; see also Lucinda Shen, Wells Fargo’s Scandal Could End up Costing Bank $8 Billion, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 24, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/24/wells-fargos-scandal-could-end-up-
costing-bank-8-billion [https://perma.cc/AE5R-8YN3] (“[W]hile just 3% of Wells Fargo’s 
customers were actually affected by the scandal, public opinion regarding the bank has fallen 
dramatically, leading some 14% of customers to say they have already decided to bank 
elsewhere.”); Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Says Customers Shied Away After Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2016/10/15/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-says-
customers-shied-away-after-scandal.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/392E-QAGF] (stating that, 
by October 2016, Wells Fargo customers had opened 25 percent fewer checking accounts and 
applied for 20 percent fewer credit cards than in September 2015). 
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their business from Wells Fargo because, as Ohio governor John 
Kasich of Ohio explained on Twitter, “Wells Fargo has lost the right to 
do business with the State of Ohio because its actions have cost it the 
public’s confidence.”155 As expected, we also see the financial spillover 
effects for the industry with consumers switching business from Wells 
Fargo to its peers.156 
At first glance, Wells Fargo’s fate looks like a perfect example of 
the financial harm that can result from reputational consequences, 
similar to the example discussed in Part II.A: government enforcement 
action causes reputational harm to an organization, which changes the 
terms with which stakeholders such as investors and consumers are 
willing to exchange with the affected organization. But the scandal not 
only exemplifies the financial consequences of reputational harm for 
Wells Fargo. It also illustrates the ways that reputational harm can 
have regulatory spillover effects for the broader industry.157 One theme 
 
 155. John Kasich (@JohnKasich), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
JohnKasich/status/786990903198093312/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc percent5Etfw [https://perma.cc/ 
2K6J-G57C]; Alistair Gray, Illinois Suspends $30bn of Business with Wells Fargo, FIN. TIMES 
(Oct. 3, 2016) (reporting that “Illinois is to stop using Wells as a broker dealer for about $30bn 
worth of annual short-term investments, such as repurchase agreements and commercial paper”); 
Ohio Extends Ban on Wells Fargo Business by Six Months, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2017) (reporting 
that in October 2016 Governor John Kasich stated that he “would avoid working with the bank 
on debt offerings or financial services for one year” and that the governor extended the ban 
through April 2018). 
 156. CG42, supra note 18, at 8. Although Chase and Bank of America stand to gain the most 
from switching, other national banks, such as US Bank, TD Bank, and SunTrust, among others, 
will also gain deposits and revenue from switching. Id. These findings are also consistent with a 
JD Power study that found that when consumers switch banks, they usually switch to another 
large bank. Christina Rexrode & Emily Glazer, Wall Street’s Campaign Season: Dodging a Bullet, 
Running into Wells Fargo, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 3, 2016, 8:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/wall-streets-campaign-season-dodging-a-bullet-running-into-wells-fargo-1478181423 
[https://perma.cc/W9YV-9PH6]. 
 157. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) sent formal letters 
to large and regional banks, such as Citigroup, Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase, requiring 
information about sales practices and incentive-compensation structures. Emily Glazer & 
Christina Rexrode, Big U.S. Retail Bank Operations Under Scrutiny After Wells Scandal, WALL 
STREET J. (Oct. 25, 2016, 9:11 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-u-s-retail-bank-operations-
under-scrutiny-follow-wells-scandal-1477400747 [https://perma.cc/3N6Y-KBW9]. The scandal 
also shone a spotlight on those regulating the banks. Yuka Hayashi, Wells Fargo Isn’t the Only 
Bank That Draws Cross-Selling Complaints, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 28, 2016), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-isnt-the-only-bank-that-draws-cross-selling-complaints-
1475058602 [https://perma.cc/U6U6-MK4L] (“Analysts say the problems at Wells Fargo put 
pressure on government agencies to more closely regulate the cross-selling of products and 
incentive compensation tied to tough sales goals.”); see also Sharon Gilad & Tamar Yogev, How 
Reputation Regulates Regulators: Illustrations from the Regulation of Retail Finance, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION, supra note 63, at 320, 320–21 (discussing 
the reputations of regulators); Shu-yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 
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that emerged in the wake of Wells Fargo scandal was the need for 
accountability from actors at the very top of these banks, including how 
executive compensation might be used to encourage accountability.158 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, large U.S. banks introduced or 
strengthened clawback policies in order to increase executives’ 
accountability for taking risks.159 The rules differ among banks, but 
they usually authorize banks to take back stock awards or 
compensation if an executive misbehaves, such as by taking improper 
risks or underperforming, or if a bank needs to significantly restate 
results.160 For example, Wells Fargo’s specific clawback provision 
allows the bank to recover compensation when “‘misconduct’ by an 
executive officer [ ]contributes to the company having to restate all or 
a significant portion of its financial statements” or “incentive 
compensation was based on materially inaccurate financial 
information, whether or not the executive was responsible.”161 In the 
wake of the Wells Fargo scandal, Wells Fargo’s board utilized the 
clawback provision and former CEO John Stumpf gave back $41 
million, making him the “the first CEO of a major U.S. bank to actually 
have to give back significant pay or benefits as the result of a 
scandal.”162 
 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 37–40) (describing the risk of sub-optimal tax policymaking 
when leaked tax information increases pressure on tax authorities to respond). 
 158. Victoria Finkle, House Panel Questions Fed Chief on Wells Fargo Scandal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/business/dealbook/house-panel-questions-
fed-chief-on-wells-fargo-scandal.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/6ZX6-2KY3] (“How can line-
level workers be held accountable to the degree that they clearly have been, and yet nobody in 
the upper level of management seems to be taking responsibility for it?” (quoting Representative 
Keith Ellison)).  
 159. Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 144–45 
(2011); Oran & Kerber, supra note 20. 
 160. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20. 
 161. Kevin Wack, Wells Fargo Scandal Will Rewrite the Book on Clawing Back Pay, 
AMERICAN BANKER (Sept. 16, 2016) (quoting Wells Fargo’s 2016 proxy statement), https:// 
www.americanbanker.com/news/wells-fargo-scandal-will-rewrite-the-book-on-clawing-back-pay 
[http://perma.cc/D6Q3-BJKV] (quoting Wells Fargo’s 2016 proxy statement). 
 162. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20; see INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS OF THE BOARD OF WELLS 
FARGO & COMPANY SALES PRACTICE INVESTIGATION REPORT 10 (2017), https:// 
www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X77J-7A2K] (explaining that the Wells Fargo Board determined in 
April 2017 to clawback an additional $28 million of Stumpf’s incentive compensation). The board 
“has imposed forfeitures, clawbacks and compensation adjustments on senior leaders totaling 
more than $180 million.” Id. at i. A few years earlier, J.P. Morgan Chase imposed pay clawbacks 
on traders and executives involved in the London Whale trading scandal. Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. 
Morgan: ‘Whale’ Clawbacks About Two Years of Compensation, WALL STREET J. (July 13, 2012, 
2:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303740704577524730994899406 
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But the reputational harm of the scandal also affects the broader 
industry; many of Wells Fargo’s industry peers took steps to 
differentiate their practices from Wells Fargo’s.163 The use of clawback 
policies may therefore not stop with Stumpf and Wells Fargo, and may 
potentially prime other banks to use their own clawback policies as 
another means of proactively distinguishing their consumer practices 
from those of Wells Fargo.164 One commentator explained that Wells 
Fargo misstepped by only taking action on the clawback provision after 
the scandal was out of control, and that the boards of other banks may 
“learn from this mistake.”165 Consequently, the Wells Fargo scandal 
not only poses risk of regulatory reaction but also of preemptive self-
regulatory action.166 The example of Wells Fargo reveals the 
importance of two factors for converting reputational spillover effects 
experienced by industry peers into organizational change by these 
same actors: industry mistrust and regulatory risk. First, while the 
Wells Fargo scandal did not improve the public image of large banks, 
the banking industry had already struggled with loss of public faith. A 
Gallup poll in August 2016 showed that only thirty-eight percent of 
Americans view the banking industry positively—and that was before 
 
[https://perma.cc/8RPB-DBAG].  
 163. See, e.g., Glazer & Rexrode, supra note 157 (describing media explanations provided by 
senior executives at JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup regarding their own sales practices and how 
these practices differed from Wells Fargo’s); Ramstad, supra note 19 (“I don’t even know what 
the cross-sell is at this bank. Honest to God, I’ve never ever looked at that number.” (quoting 
U.S. Bancorp CEO Richard Davis)). But see Rachel Louise Ensign, What the Wells Fargo Cross-
Selling Mess Means for Banks, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
what-the-wells-fargo-cross-selling-mess-means-for-banks-1473965166 [https://perma.cc/8VDH-
26FJ] (describing the use of cross-selling in the financial services industry); Hayashi, supra note 
157 (“Problematic sales practices at banks may extend beyond the abuses revealed in this month’s 
$185 million enforcement action against Wells Fargo & Co., according to a new analysis of 
customer complaints maintained by the U.S. government.”). 
 164. Id.  
 165. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20; see also Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Slams Former Bosses’ 
High-Pressure Sales Tactics, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 10, 2017, 8:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/wells-fargo-claws-back-75-million-more-from-john-stumpf-and-former-retail-bank-
head-1491823808 [https://perma.cc/M7PB-GMQF] (explaining how the investigation by the 
board of Wells Fargo into its sales practices “not only has rocked Wells Fargo but the broader 
banking industry, with dozens of firms examining their own sales practices at the behest of 
regulators”).  
 166. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20. The regulatory risk may have abated because of the 
deregulatory stance advanced under the Trump Administration. Jen Wieczner, Why Yahoo CEO 
Marissa Mayer’s $141 Million Payday Is Safe from the Hack Cover-Up, FORTUNE (Jan. 24, 2017, 
6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/01/24/yahoo-marissa-mayer-investigation [https://perma.cc/ 
YW8F-UKQM].  
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news of the Wells Fargo scandal broke.167 According to Bancorp Chief 
Executive Richard Davis, the banking industry is still attempting to 
rebuild its reputation following the financial crisis.168 The industry 
spillover effects of the Wells Fargo scandal jeopardizes this redemption 
because customers can better understand what the banks did wrong.169 
The average layperson may not understand how a collateralized debt 
obligation works or its role in the 2008 financial crisis, but they do 
understand the simple act of lying.170 In the words of an executive at 
Citigroup, “Any event that causes people to question the motives of 
any bank is bad for every bank.”171 Therefore, recovery of executive 
compensation could signal to a mistrustful public that the banking 
industry is willing to accept accountability. 
Second, the Wells Fargo scandal unfolded at a time when the 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) had proposed a new rule on 
clawback practices.172 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) had already 
required CEOs and CFOs to return compensation under certain 
conditions.173 However, in July 2015, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the SEC 
proposed Rule 10D-1, which requires more than did the SOA.174 When 
the scandal broke, industry actors feared that the Wells Fargo scandal 
may lead to stricter rules, more concrete requirements, and a faster 
timeline to complete the regulations.175 The reputational harm caused 
by the Wells Fargo scandal also potentially jeopardized the industry’s 
position in the prelude to new regulation.176 
 
 167. Rexrode & Glazer, supra note 156. 
 168. Ramstad, supra note 19.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Rexrode & Glazer, supra note 156. 
 172. Press Release, U.S. SEC, SEC Proposes Rules Requiring Companies to Adopt Clawback 
Policies on Executive Compensation (July 1, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
136.html [https://perma.cc/2E8Y-L9U9]. 
 173. Sale, supra note 159, at 145. 
 174. See SEC Proposes Rules on Clawback Policies, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 7 (July 6, 
2015), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/07/sec_proposes_rules_
on_clawback_policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXH3-PC8E] (comparing the broader scope of Rule 
10D-1 to the more narrow provisions of SOA). 
 175. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20.  
 176. See Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (2013) 
(“When corporate actors lose sight of the fact that the companies they run and decisions they 
make impact society more generally, and not just shareholders, they are subjected to publicness. 
Outside actors . . . become involved in the debate. Decisions about governance move from Wall 
Street to Main Street.” (emphasis added)). “Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley in the wake of Enron 
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C. Sanctions Based on Barriers to Entry 
Part II.B described how organizational change resulted from 
enhanced regulatory risk as a result of the spillover effect, whereby 
information regarding one bad actor taints an industry’s collective 
reputation. However, regulatory risk can also arise from heterogeneity 
as opposed to homogeneity. Incumbent organizations can intentionally 
manipulate social norms to discourage the entry or subsequent 
performance of new entrants.177 For this strategy to succeed, the 
incumbent attackers need to be sufficiently different from their targets, 
or the de-legitimizing strategies can backfire and cast a shadow over 
both the incumbent and the new entrant.178 Heterogeneity is therefore 
a precondition for these forms of intentional deterrent strategies. 
Incumbent organizations manipulate social norms to delegitimize 
their competitors and legitimate their own organizations in the eyes of 
stakeholders such as consumers. These maneuvers strategically use 
legitimacy to achieve some form of competitive advantage. While this 
strategy can be used against mature industry competitors already 
present in the market, the analysis in this section focuses on the use of 
legitimacy as a barrier to entry for new entrants. In these battles 
between incumbent firms and new entrants, incumbent firms used 
organizational form as the means of delegitimizing entrants. 
Incumbents seek to discourage entry by new competitors 
organizationally distinct from themselves by delegitimizing these 
organizations’ alternative organizational forms. These delegitimizing 
strategies can have serious consequences for the new entrant, creating 
enhanced regulatory risk, increasing financial costs, and changing 
consumer preferences.179 
The case illustration below explains how taxi companies, who are 
incumbent actors in an industry, use information from lawsuits and 
government action to delegitimize the way that Uber does business, 
 
and WorldCom and those scandals were instrumental to its passage. The failures of private 
corporate actors to prevent or adequately respond to those scandals—to self-regulate—were also 
extremely important. Those failures resulted in more public scrutiny of corporations and 
corporate decision making, which, in turn, created pressure for Congress to do something. 
Sarbanes-Oxley was the result.” Id. at 1022 (footnotes omitted). 
 177. Bitektine, supra note 30, at 84. 
 178. Id. at 84, 87. 
 179. Id. at 80 (stating that strategic deterrence “may provoke regulatory action against the 
new entrant or put the targeted organization into a situation of legitimacy crisis, which may lead 
to organization’s isolation from important social networks and constrain its access to critical 
resources.”).  
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thereby challenging the latter’s ability to compete. Incumbent actors 
can use legal institutions to create barriers to entry in two ways. First, 
they can advocate for laws that ban actors, such as new entrants, from 
operating unless those actors meet specific regulatory requirements.180 
In Uber’s case, however, it entered new markets and operated illegally, 
amassing public support to resist attempts to shut down its 
operations.181 Second, incumbents can use information disclosure from 
litigation to erect barriers to entry based on legitimacy by discrediting 
an entrant’s operations. Specifically, incumbents can use the existence 
of lawsuits and government proceedings to ruin the reputation of an 
entrant’s organizational form and scare customers away. The following 
case illustration demonstrates how legal institutions create 
reputational sanctions that can serve as these types of barriers to entry. 
Unlike the other case illustrations, it does not demonstrate 
organizational change and therefore does not include the analysis of 
priming, pivoting, and positioning present in the other case 
illustrations. 
1. The Information Wars between Uber and the Taxicab, Limousine 
& Paratransit Association.  Uber is a ride-sharing company that 
challenged the traditional model of commercial transportation offered 
by taxi companies in the United States and abroad. Riders request an 
Uber ride through a phone app that provides the rider with information 
about available drivers nearby, pricing, wait time, and vehicle details.182 
While riders embraced Uber’s model of transportation, incumbent 
transportation service providers challenged the entry of this new 
market player. The thrust of this challenge was led by an industry 
association representing the incumbent transportation service 
providers: the Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit Association (TLPA). 
Uber’s business model is different from ordinary taxi companies, so the 
members of the TLPA sought to use legal institutions to attack those 
differences and delegitimize Uber. 
Uber’s industry opponents used two strategies to reshape norms 
 
 180. See Boris Bindman, Keep on Truckin’, Uber: Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to 
Challenge Regulatory Roadblocks to TNCs, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 136, 172 n.190 
(2015); infra notes 183–85 and accompanying text. 
 181. Marcus Wohlsen, Uber’s Brilliant Strategy To Make Itself Too Big To Ban, WIRED (July 
8, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/07/ubers-brilliant-strategy-to-make-itself-too-
big-to-ban/ [https://perma.cc/55AY-P5NL].  
 182. How Uber Works, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/how-uber-works/ [https://perma.cc/ 
KN29-D7NX ]. 
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in a way that was intended to delegitimize Uber in the eyes of 
stakeholders, especially potential customers. Under the first strategy, 
the TLPA tried to shape legal norms to restrict or eliminate Uber’s 
business,183 usually by opposing local regulations that would authorize 
Uber’s operations in new markets.184 Uber’s competitors also lobbied 
for increased regulatory requirements for Uber and other ride-sharing 
services.185 
The taxi industry also embraced a second strategy: using lawsuits 
to shape social norms and public opinion regarding Uber.186 As stated 
in the Washington Post, “[t]he battle over the future of the taxi industry 
is in many ways an information war.”187 It is no secret that Uber faces 
a barrage of lawsuits against it. Information shared in the lawsuits 
provided the ammunition for a reputational battle between taxi 
companies and Uber. After all, it is one thing for taxi companies as 
competitors to sling allegations at Uber—the public may be 
understandably skeptical considering the source of the information. 
 
 183. See Marlize van Romburgh, Meet the International Player Powering Big Taxi’s Fight 
Against Uber, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015, 10:43 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2015/03/uber-regulations-taxi-industry-veolia-war-transdev.html 
[https://perma.cc/2DSD-F2Y4] (“The way that they protect their business is by trying to use laws 
to keep out competitors, rather than improving the rider and driver experiences.” (quoting Corey 
Owens, Uber’s head of global public policy)).  
 184. Larry Downes, Lessons From Uber: Why Innovation and Regulation Don’t Mix, FORBES 
(Feb. 6, 2013, 5:00 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2013/02/06/lessons-from-uber-
why-innovation-and-regulation-dont-mix/#69596084de94 [https://perma.cc/JLC2-95ZG]. 
 185. See Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite Against Uber and Other Ride-Share Services, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/cab-
companies-unite-against-uber-and-other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11b23d52-1e3f-11e4-
82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html?utm_term=.78efd2670bb4 [https://perma.cc/2EZY-EZMG] 
(explaining how Washington, D.C.-area taxi companies increased coordination efforts to fight for 
regulation of ride sharing, including “joining labor unions, labor organizers and . . . lobbying 
jointly,” and “sharing notes and filing complaints and lawsuits”); Saitto, supra note 31 (reporting 
that according to TLPA leader Mark Joseph, one of Uber’s major competitors “prompted 
investigations into Uber by sending letters to regulators in core markets like Colorado, Maryland, 
and Pennsylvania”). 
 186. On the heels of President Trump’s Executive Order of January 27, 2017 restricting 
immigration, the New York Taxi Workers Alliance announced a one-hour work stoppage at JFK 
International Airport as a sign of solidarity with those protesting the order. When Uber drivers 
did not cease service during that period, they were accused of “strike-breaking” and many 
customers deleted the Uber app on their phones in reaction. Ashley Lutz, Furious Customers Are 
Deleting the Uber App After Drivers Went to JFK Airport During a Protest and Strike, BUS. 
INSIDER (Jan. 29, 2017, 11:38 AM) http://www.businessinsider.com/delete-uber-hashtag-jfk-
airport-taxi-strikes-2017-1 [https://perma.cc/4H5F-TUQF]. 
 187. Nancy Scola, Uber, Allies Kick Off Campaign To Brand ‘Big Taxi’, WASH. POST (Sept., 
12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/12/uber-allies-kick-off-
campaign-to-brand-big-taxi/?utm_term=.39160de24d39 [https://perma.cc/TBB7-QJL5].  
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But lawsuits elevate the normative effect of these allegations, 
providing an alternative source for the narrative. The lawsuits provide 
“second-opinion effects” in which “the process of determining whether 
to impose legal sanctions produces information on how the company 
behaved. . . . In that sense, litigation or regulatory investigations often 
create another ‘third-party assessment’ of the company’s behavior.”188 
In this battle for public opinion, both the TLPA and Uber 
launched rivalling websites to serve as important information 
intermediaries regarding the other’s behavior. The websites especially 
reported legal developments in court rulings or regulatory action 
concerning the other. TLPA’s website is called Who’s Driving You?, 
and its homepage features a Twitter feed that collects and disseminates 
information about Uber and its drivers that potential customers would 
find most upsetting.189 For example, between October 27, 2016 and 
November 4, 2016, a significant number of the Twitter posts dealt with 
reports of sexual assault by Uber drivers against women and 
children.190 The Twitter feed also updates viewers on any regulatory or 
judicial decisions against Uber. 
The taxi industry disseminates the information from the courts to 
the public but is not the direct source of that information. For example, 
the Who’s Driving You? website provides the reader with direct links 
to court filings so that potential riders can read the allegations for 
themselves. The difference between the two is the perceived authority 
of the source of that information. By providing website users with 
direct access to legal documents, the taxi industry provides a legal 
narrative supporting what it has been alleging all along. It also draws 
the public’s attention to the concern that Uber’s behavior is not only 
undesirable but that it also potentially breaks the law, which comes 
with its own set of normative consequences.191 These reputational 
consequences, amplified by TLPA’s website, help delegitimize Uber in 
the eyes of stakeholders. 
 
 188. Shapira, supra note 23, at 1213. 
 189. Who’s Driving You, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org [https://perma.cc/Q9JW-K9CX]; 
see @WhosDrivingYou, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WhosDrivingYou.  
 190. @WhosDrivingYou, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ search?l=&q=from%3AWhosDriv -
ingYou%20since%3A2016-10-27%20until%3A2016-11-04&src=typd [https://perma.cc/5HTK-
TH66]. 
 191. For example, see the “shaming” scholarship that examines the expressive function of 
legal institutions and punishment. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996). 
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D. Policy Sanctions 
Revelations regarding corporate misconduct not only render us 
more likely to mistrust misbehaving organizations in their role as 
market actors (how they act in the marketplace for goods and services) 
but also as societal actors (how they interact in society at large). A 
legitimacy crisis can paint an industry as untrustworthy, possibly 
generating an existential crisis for the industry as a whole or 
undermining its credibility in policy debates concerning its future.192 
Diminished public trust in an industry, especially concerning its past 
behavior in a particular area, reduces the likelihood that policymakers 
and the public will believe anything that an industry’s actors have to 
say. The consequence of this mistrust is that industry actors may have 
a diminished role in policymaking, either through direct exclusionary 
measures or reduced opportunities for consultation. When faced with 
these consequences, organizations are more likely to adopt 
organizational innovations that communicate their trustworthiness to 
observers, such as new voluntary industry initiatives or 
multistakeholder partnerships.193 
The following case illustration explains the challenges 
encountered by the oil and gas industry when its members want to 
participate in climate policy discussions. Government investigations, as 
well as the industry’s own actions, gave the industry a reputation as an 
opponent to climate change policy. This reputational branding 
strengthened state and NGO demands to exclude oil and gas 
companies from international climate policy discussions. In this 
environment, the oil and gas industry devised a series of voluntary 
initiatives to change public perceptions of the industry. It also led to 
organizational shifts within the fossil fuels industry and new alignments 
among industry actors. 
1. The Paris Climate Accord and the Oil and Gas Industry.  In 2013, 
dozens of NGOs specifically requested that the UN and the UN 
 
 192. See Deegan, supra note 95, at 293 (“Legitimacy is considered to be a resource on which 
an organization is dependent for survival.”).  
 193. See Michael L. Barnett, Finding a Working Balance Between Competitive and Communal 
Strategies, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1753, 1760 (2006) (“Industries commonly intensify their collective 
efforts when threatened by government regulation or loss of public approval.”); David Hess & 
Thomas W. Dunfee, The Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate Social Reporting: Implementing a 
Standard of Optimal Truthful Disclosure as a Solution, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 5, 8 (2007) (“If a firm 
fails to meet society’s expectations, then it must act to re-establish its legitimacy to fend off social 
sanctions.”).  
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) implement new 
rules to protect global climate discussions from the influence of actors 
within the fossil fuel industry.194 The NGOs recommended that the 
UNFCC follow the approach of the World Health Organization and 
Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC), which restricts industry participation and requires that states 
protect their policymaking from “commercial and other vested 
interests of the tobacco industry.”195 
This concern about the role of the fossil fuels industry in climate 
change policy resurfaced in 2015 with the New York attorney general’s 
investigation into Exxon Mobil’s climate change disclosures.196 The 
investigation examined whether the company suppressed climate 
change research and committed consumer and securities fraud by lying 
to the public about the environmental effects of its products.197 Three 
 
 194. Open Letter Calling for Rules To Protect the Integrity of Climate Policy-Making from 
Vested Corporate Interests, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY (Nov. 21, 2013), http:// 
corporateeurope.org/blog/open-letter-calling-rules-protect-integrity-climate-policy-making-
vested-corporate-interests [https://perma.cc/URU7-K8SZ] (showing that more than seventy-five 
civil society organizations had signed on to the open letter calling on the UN to protect 
environmental policy negotiations from the fossil fuel industry’s influence). 
 195. Id. (quoting WHO, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, at art. 5.3 
(2003), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42811/1/9241591013.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/ 
XXR3-VFYU]). Civil society actors also petitioned to exclude members of the fossil fuels industry 
from participating in the Marrakech climate talks in November 2016, where representatives from 
over two hundred countries met to discuss ways to implement the Paris Agreement. Michael 
Slezak, Marrakech Climate Talks: US Accepts Petition Calling for Fossil Fuel Lobbyists To Be 
Excluded, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/16/ 
marrakech-climate-talks-us-accepts-petition-calling-for-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-to-be-excluded 
[https://perma.cc/5GQE-UTP6]. The petition supported earlier recommendations by developing 
countries for a conflict of interest policy that would screen out nonstate participants based on 
conflicts of interest. Id. 
 196. Lynn Cook, Exxon Mobil Gets Subpoena from N.Y. Regarding Climate-Change 
Research, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 5, 2015, 6:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-mobil-
gets-subpoena-from-n-y-regarding-climate-change-research-1446760684 [https://perma.cc/SGP3-
LYZL].  
 197. See Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible Climate 
Change Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jL53WA 
[https://perma.cc/6AH5-7PNG] (“The investigation focuses on whether statements the company 
made to investors about climate risks as recently as this year were consistent with the company’s 
own long-running scientific research.”). In March 2017, the New York attorney general accused 
ExxonMobil of withholding documents from the investigation that related to correspondence 
from Secretary of State Rex Tillerson when he was chairman and chief executive of ExxonMobil. 
Christopher M. Matthews & Erin Ailworth, Rex Tillerson Used Email Alias at Exxon To Discuss 
Climate Change, New York Says, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 13, 2017, 8:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/rex-tillerson-used-alias-email-at-exxon-to-discuss-climate-change-new-york-says-148945
0814 [https://perma.cc/EMY5-2KGT] (describing allegations that “Exxon hadn’t disclosed that 
Rex Tillerson, the former chairman and chief executive, used an alias email address to discuss 
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other attorneys general—from California, Massachusetts, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands—launched similar probes into ExxonMobil regarding 
the company’s disclosure of climate change information.198 The federal 
government also got involved, as the SEC launched its own similar 
investigation into whether ExxonMobil fraudulently failed to account 
for the impact of climate change and increasing environmental 
regulation when valuing its fossil-fuel assets.199 Shortly thereafter, a 
class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of ExxonMobil’s shareholders, 
alleging securities fraud based on the same climate change 
allegations.200 
Given that the fossil fuel industry has weathered a lot of bad press 
over the years, it is possible that these investigations did not create 
unique reputational consequences for ExxonMobil. But the initial 
story could not have broken at a worse moment for ExxonMobil; the 
New York attorney general announced his investigation into whether 
ExxonMobil had lied about climate change right as world leaders were 
convening a historic gathering in Paris to discuss climate change. In 
December 2015, representatives of 195 countries met in Paris, France 
for the Paris Climate Summit and reached a landmark international 
agreement on climate change: the Paris Climate Accord.201 These 
countries agreed to report their progress on cutting emissions, with 
 
risk-management issues related to climate change”). 
 198. See Kiah Collier & Jim Malewitz, Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil, and Climate Change 
Probes – and How Texas Is Involved, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 11, 2016, 12:00 PM), https:// 
www.texastribune.org/2016/12/11/everything-you-need-know-about-exxonmobil-climate-/ 
[https://perma.cc/LNZ9-Z2PY] (describing the investigations by the attorneys general of New 
York, Massachusetts, California, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Scientific American reported that 
ExxonMobil had known about the risks of man-made climate change for more than forty years 
but had not disclosed that information to its shareholders or the public. Shannon Hall, Exxon 
Knew About Climate Change Almost 40 Years Ago, SCI. AM. (Oct. 26, 2015), https:// 
www.scientificamerican.com/article/exxon-knew-about-climate-change-almost-40-years-ago/ 
[https://perma.cc/LC3Y-C2VE]. 
 199. See Bradley Olson & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Probes Exxon over Accounting for 
Climate Change, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 20, 2016, 7:55 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-
investigating-exxon-on-valuing-of-assets-accounting-practices-1474393593 [https://perma.cc/N5F
N-YZBS] (noting that the SEC had already been receiving documents related to the New York 
attorney general’s ongoing investigation and then began its own efforts to request information 
and documents from Exxon and its auditor in August 2016).  
 200. Press Release, Ryan & Maniskas, LLP, Ryan & Maniskas, LLP Announces Class Action 
Lawsuit Against Exxon Mobil Corporation (Nov. 16, 2016, 6:45 PM), http:// www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/ryan—maniskas-llp-announces-class-action-lawsuit-against-exxon-mobil-
corporation-300364532.html [https://perma.cc/N2YA-8ZT5]. 
 201. Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 12, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2k9vJgw [https://perma.cc/B2SF-PPWX] (describing the historic 
deal intended to address the risk of climate change).  
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reporting duties commencing in 2023.202 The global strategy is to limit 
global warming to two degrees Celsius, with the hope of further 
reducing that limit in the future.203 The background of the climate 
change talks increased the stakes of the industry’s image problem, 
while the investigations were another mark against an industry 
perceived as hostile to climate change policymaking.204 
This background of mistrust and desire for exclusion helps to 
explain why the fossil fuels industry resorted to a legitimacy-enhancing 
device in an attempt to remain relevant in climate policy discussions 
that affect them. In September 2014, a group of oil and gas companies 
launched the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI) at the UN Climate 
Summit in New York.205 The OGCI is a “voluntary, industry-driven 
initiative, which will enable the Oil & Gas industry to . . . share industry 
best practices, advance technological solutions, and to catalyse 
meaningful action and coordination on climate change.”206 The OGCI 
includes energy giants BP, Shell, Statoil, and Total.207 The ten OGCI 
member companies provide almost one-fifth of all oil and gas 
production in the world and supply nearly ten percent of the world’s 
energy.208 OGCI’s mission is to “use our collective resources to 
accelerate actions that mitigate the greenhouse gas emissions from the 
oil and gas industry’s operations and the use of its products, while still 
meeting the world’s energy needs.”209 
On October 16, 2015, just weeks before the Paris Summit, OGCI 
released its Joint Collaborative Declaration (the Declaration).210 Much 
 
 202. Vivienne Walt, Energy Companies Face Big Risks from Paris Climate Deal, FORTUNE 
(Dec. 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/17/energy-companies-feel-the-burn-from-paris-
climate-deal [https://perma.cc/8UUZ-ZE53].  
 203. Id. 
 204. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Climate Finance and Its Governance: Moving to a Low 
Carbon Economy Through Socially Responsible Financing?, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 597, 603–04 
(2009) (explaining how fossil fuel companies and their associated financial institutions suffer 
reputational risks because of climate change concerns). 
 205. Press Release, Oil & Gas Climate Initiative, Climate Summit 2014: Oil & Gas Climate 
Initiative Action Summit (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/news/ 
climate-summit-2014.html [https://perma.cc/7XRA-T7VF].  
 206. Id. 
 207. About the Oil and Gas Initiative, OIL & GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http:// 
www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/about.html [https://perma.cc/L8K8-WKG8] (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2017). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Joint Collaborative Declaration, OIL & GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE (2015), http:// 
www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/~/media/Files/O/Ogci/documents/ogci-ceo-Declaration-
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of the Declaration was devoted to communicating the cooperative 
attitudes of the OGCI on climate change.211 The legitimacy-enhancing 
functions of the Declaration are confirmed by statements made by both 
industry representatives and their opponents. In October 2015, the 
CEO of Total stated that the oil and gas industry “need[s] to be on the 
offensive . . . We need to be serious to bring answers and solutions to 
the table and not leave policy makers raising their fingers that they (oil 
companies) are the devils.”212 This legitimacy-enhancing function of 
the Declaration was exactly what the environmental groups feared, 
labelling the Declaration as nothing more than “greenwashing.”213 In 
the words of a Greenpeace activist, “Each and every one of them has a 
business plan that would lead to dangerous global temperature rises, 
yet suddenly they expect us all to see them as the solution, not the 
problem . . . Arsonists don’t make good firefighters.”214 
Oil and gas industry actors realized that no one would trust their 
statements on climate policy so long as they were perceived as the 
enemy of climate policy. This context not only primed the industry for 
change but also led to interesting divisions within the energy industry. 
These organizational shifts demonstrate both isomorphic attraction 
and repulsion as oil and gas actors attempted to align themselves with 
the UN, on the one hand, while distancing themselves from other 
industry actors that could only compromise their “clean” image. 
First, the oil and gas industry pivoted toward the UN, releasing 
public statements supporting the Paris Accord.215 Critically, in a press 
 
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/69MT-4HUG]. 
 211. See id. (enumerating the collaborative initiatives planned by OGCI member companies 
and pledging to regularly report on their progress).  
 212. Jeff Reed, UN Climate Conference Gets Underway. Here’s What Oilpros Need To Know, 
OILPRO (May 14, 2016), http://oilpro.com/post/20399/un-climate-conference-starts-monday-
here-oilpros-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/V8PC-GLXZ].  
 213. See Michael Stothard & Pilita Clark, Energy Groups Pledges To Tackle Climate Change, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015, 10:51 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/ed42bad4-73e0-11e5-bdb1-
e6e4767162cc [https://perma.cc/6HVS-Z6LJ] (“Environmental groups accused the energy 
companies of trying to soften their image by supporting the Paris conference but failing to offer 
concrete change.”).  
 214. Id. 
 215. See Darren Woods, The Future of Energy – Opportunities and Challenges, 
EXXONMOBIL: ENERGY FACTOR BLOG (Feb. 23, 2017), https://energyfactor.exxonmobil.com/ 
perspectives/the-future-of-energy-opportunities-and-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/RGJ9-ZR68] 
(quoting ExxonMobil Chairman and CEO as saying “I believe, and my company believes, that 
climate risks warrant action . . . . At ExxonMobil, we’re encouraged that the pledges made at last 
year’s Paris Accord create an effective framework for all countries to address rising emissions; in 
fact, our company forecasts carbon reductions consistent with the results of the Paris accord 
commitments.”). A year after the Paris Accord was reached, ExxonMobil wrote a letter to the 
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release following the Paris Accord, OGCI identified similarities 
between the Declaration and the Paris Accord.216 By connecting these 
two institutions, OGCI demonstrated institutional convergence 
between the industry’s solutions and what the public wants, reinforcing 
the message that the industry is receptive and progressive on climate 
policy. 
The oil and gas industry simultaneously pivoted away from an 
energy peer: coal. In order to absolve itself from “enemy status,” the 
oil and gas industry passed that label on to coal companies in order to 
deflect public blame away from themselves. Chief Executive Officer of 
Total, Patrick Pouyanne, went so far as to announce in mid-2015 that 
“the enemy is coal,” while “Total is gas, and gas is good.”217 Why blame 
coal? Isomorphic repulsion can partially account for these industry 
alignments. The oil and gas industry is in need of legitimacy, so it chose 
to isolate coal as the energy actor that draws the most public ire, 
making coal a strategic sacrifice in order to preserve the image and 
credibility of the remaining energy companies. The oil and gas industry 
abandoned the umbrella of the fossil fuels industry in favor of coal on 
the one side versus oil and gas companies on the other; these are the 
“positioning” tactics where organizations cultivate new identities. For 
its part, the World Coal Association objected to this industry division, 
explaining that the entire fossil fuel industry should work 
 
Trump Administration advocating in favor of the international climate agreement. Matt Egan, 
Exxon to Trump: Don’t Ditch Paris Climate Change Deal, CNN MONEY (Mar. 29, 2017, 1:50 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/29/investing/exxon-trump-paris-climate-change/ index.html 
[https://perma.cc/X4R7-Q7W4] (“ExxonMobil doesn’t want President Trump to abandon the 
global climate agreement reached in Paris.”); Aric Jenkins, Even ExxonMobil Wants President 
Trump To Stick With the Paris Climate Deal, FORTUNE (Mar. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/ 
2017/03/29/exxon-mobil-donald-trump-paris-agreement-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/NY42-
EQ4V]. Cf. Timothy Cama, Oil Exec: Trump Should Keep US in Paris Climate Pact, THE HILL 
(Mar. 7, 2017, 4:20 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/ 322796-conocophillips-
head-trump-should-keep-us-in-paris-climate-pact [https://perma.cc/RH3V-ZLM7] (“The head of 
oil giant ConocoPhillips said President Trump should keep the United States in the landmark 
Paris climate change agreement.”).  
 216. See Press Release, Oil & Gas Climate Initiative, OGCI Welcomes the Paris Agreement 
(Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/news/ogci-welcomes-the-paris-
agreement.html [https://perma.cc/LVC5-H396] (“In alignment with the Paris Agreement, the 
OGCI’s Joint Declaration issued October 2015 recognized the general ambition to limit global 
average temperature rise . . . .”). 
 217. Rakteem Katakey & Tara Patel, Big Oil’s Plan To Become Big Gas, BLOOMBERG (June 
2, 2015, 6:04 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-01/big-oil-becomes-big-gas-
as-climate-threat-spurs-tussle-with-coal [https://perma.cc/Z3TA-ZL36] (“Oil companies that 
have pumped trillions of barrels of crude from the ground are now saying the future is in their 
other main product: natural gas, a fuel they’re promoting as the logical successor to coal.”).  
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collaboratively.218 The quest for legitimacy thus not only shaped 
institutional choices, such as the Declaration, but also organizational 
alignments and industry divisions. 
III.  OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNS 
Below, this Part discusses two factors that potentially compromise 
the use of reputational regulation to encourage companies to change 
their organizational practices. The first relates to whether reputational 
regulation can continue in the face of procedures and mechanisms that 
impede the flow of information from the courts. The second is whether, 
even if reputational regulation can continue in practice, it should do so. 
This Article has explained the advantages that reputational regulation 
can offer for incentivizing organizational change. However, 
reputational regulation may also lead to other effects—potentially 
unintended and unpredictable ones—that may caution against the use 
of reputational sanctions. 
A. Challenges to Reputational Regulation: Barriers to Information 
Flow from the Courts 
Reputational regulation is dependent upon information from the 
courts. Procedures and mechanisms that impede this information flow 
therefore inhibit the creation of reputational sanctions. This Section 
discusses two challenges to information flow that may impede the 
operation of reputational regulation. 
1. Transparency Costs of Arbitration.  Arbitration is a form of 
alternative dispute resolution wherein parties contractually agree to 
resolve their dispute confidentially through a third-party 
decisionmaker.219 Scholars and consumer groups, among others, have 
criticized consumer arbitration for its lack of transparency, for 
depriving the public of the opportunity to learn about risks to its well-
being.220 
 
 218. Stothard & Clark, supra note 213. 
 219. AM. ARB. ASS’N, AAA CONSUMER ARBITRATION GLOSSARY OF TERMS 1 (Sept. 21, 
2017), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA%20Arbitration%20 
Glossary%20of%20Terms.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6AY-2ZAJ]. 
 220. See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time To Let Some Sun 
Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 487 (2006) (“[A]rbitration 
confidentiality perpetuates public ignorance of continuing hazards, systemic problems, [and] 
public needs.”); Ramona L. Lampley, Underdog Arbitration: A Plan for Transparency, 90 WASH. 
L. REV. 1727, 1734 (2015) (“[W]ithout open access to the complaint, or decision, it does not flag 
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This Article’s analysis reveals that the transparency costs of 
arbitration are even greater: lack of information not only impedes the 
public-notice function but also the potential for reputational 
regulation. Shuttling disputes into arbitration denies the public access 
to information regarding corporate wrongdoing. But stakeholders 
need this information in order to trigger the reputational mechanics 
explained above. As discussed in Part II, stakeholders receive, 
interpret, and translate information produced by the courts into a 
variety of reputational sanctions.221 In order to fulfill this function, 
though, stakeholders need to have access to this information in the first 
place. Reputational sanctions cannot incentivize organizational change 
without access to information; therefore, private arbitration poses a 
problem for the creation of those reputational sanctions. 
For example, most people learned of Well Fargo’s sales tactics 
when it was fined by the CFPB in early September, 2016.222 But a 
number of consumers had filed lawsuits against Wells Fargo between 
2011–2016 because of its fraudulent sales tactics.223 A Wells Fargo 
consumer could have been on notice of the risk years earlier, possibly 
protecting themselves from financial harm, except that these consumer 
lawsuits were shuttled into mandatory arbitration because of a clause 
in the consumer contracts.224 The public warning function of the 
lawsuits was negated by the resort to arbitration and the confidentiality 
that arbitration affords.225 As a result, most consumers did not learn of 
 
for other consumers a potential claim or a warning that there may be a problem with the 
manufacturer. This reduces the deterrent effect our court-based tort system has on 
manufacturers, retailers, and service providers. Similarly, in the employment context, the lack of 
publicity or transparency fails to advertise what may be widespread discriminatory practices.”). 
 221. For a discussion of the financial consequences due to the legitimacy crisis faced by FIFA 
in the wake of the criminal investigations, see supra notes 120–33 and accompanying text.  
 222. Paul Blake, Timeline of the Wells Fargo Accounts Scandal, ABC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016, 
4:15 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/timeline-wells-fargo-accounts-scandal/story?id=4223 
1128 [https://perma.cc/YR5J-P4MQ] (observing that the fraud allegations came to light when the 
CFPB handed down the fines).  
 223. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 16–24, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 3:15-cv-
02159 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015) (alleging violations of state unfair competition laws, among 
others); Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration at 1, Jabbari, No. 3:15-cv-
02159 (dismissing complaint and compelling arbitration). 
 224. James Rufus Koren, Even in Fraud Cases, Wells Fargo Customers Are Locked into 
Arbitration, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-
fargo-arbitration-20151205-story.html [https://perma.cc/48JN-2MRQ] (“Judges in California and 
federal courts have ruled arbitration clauses signed by customers when they opened legitimate 
accounts prevent them from suing even over allegedly fraudulent accounts created without their 
knowledge.”).  
 225. See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 151, at 761–62 (describing how fraud detection reveals 
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the risks posed by Wells Fargo until years later.226 
2. Litigation Transparency: Protective Orders and Confidential 
Settlements.  Arbitration is not the only risk to the operation of 
reputational sanctions. The confidentiality provisions of the litigation 
or settlement processes can also impede the informational flow from 
the courts to the public, compromising stakeholders’ ability to levy 
reputational sanctions against organizations. 
One reason that courts are information intermediaries is because 
they possess unique features that encourage information flow between 
parties who are otherwise powerless to access that information.227 The 
classic information-forcing mechanism is discovery under Rule 26 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which provides parties 
access to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim 
or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”228 Discovery 
provides parties with broad tools to wrest information from the other 
side, including interrogatories, written and oral depositions, and 
production of documents.229 
But while discovery educates the plaintiff, it leaves the public 
ignorant. While we tend to recognize the importance of discovery for 
the parties, there is greater controversy relating to the public’s access 
to the information revealed through discovery but not filed. The public 
has access to filed discovery because it becomes part of the public 
 
risks to consumers); Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public 
Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 528 (2006) (“[O]pen 
conflict may serve to expose wrongdoers continuing to place others in harm’s way.”).  
 226. Senator Elizabeth Warren and other Democratic senators alleged this very charge 
against Wells Fargo. As their letter notes:  
  A major reason that these outrageous practices continued for at least five years is 
that Wells Fargo’s customer account agreement includes a forced arbitration clause. 
These clauses eliminate consumers’ ability to bring a claim in open court or to band 
together in a class action, before any dispute has arisen. . . . Even more troubling is the 
fact that arbitration proceedings are kept secret, so that other customers are deprived 
of the knowledge that their experiences might be part of a more widespread problem. 
This forced arbitration system helps hide fraudulent schemes such as the sham accounts 
at Wells Fargo from the justice system, from the news media, and from the public eye. 
This is unacceptable. 
Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Brown & Leading Democratic Senators Call on 
Wells Fargo To End Use Of Forced Arbitration On Consumers (Sept. 23, 2016), https:// 
www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-brown-and-leading-democratic-senators-call-on-wells-fargo-
to-end-use-of-forced-arbitration-on-consumers [https://perma.cc/GGK5-K7VY].  
 227. Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
357, 363 (2006); Hadfield & Ryan, supra note 21, at 81–82. 
 228. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
 229. FED. R. CIV. P. 30–34.  
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adjudicatory process.230 But much of the information gained through 
discovery remains unfiled and is not included in the adjudicatory 
process; it “does not give rise to a presumption of public access” 
because “[p]ublic monitoring of the judicial system does not require 
access to materials that are exchanged during discovery but not 
submitted for use in adjudication.”231 
Contrary to this justification, though, public monitoring is not the 
only justification for public access to the courts. Information obtained 
through litigation also serves important notice functions, offering the 
only way that consumers, employees, or other public constituents learn 
of corporate practices that pose a risk to them. For example, consumer 
groups blame court secrecy for the lack of public awareness regarding 
the faulty ignition switches in General Motors (GM) vehicles.232 
According to civil-society advocate Public Citizen, “The information 
about GM’s defective ignition switches and air bag failures, along with 
the injuries and deaths associated with them, was hidden from the 
public in confidential settlements.”233 Although potentially relevant, 
there are a number of reasons why information revealed through 
discovery does not reach the public.234 
Aside from these notice functions, we should also be wary of 
confidentiality obtained through settlement and protective orders 
because it restricts the operation of reputational sanctions235—which is 
the very reason that many corporate defendants desire confidentiality. 
Reputational sanctions invite the possibility of organizational change 
within defendant corporations because of the risk of public outcry, 
heightened regulatory oversight, or consumer backlash. These 
reactions not only protect the public by informing it of risks but also 
 
 230. Erichson, supra note 227, at 360–61. 
 231. Id. at 362. One classic justification for this difference in public access to filed and unfiled 
discovery is that public access to discovery is allowed in order to improve public monitoring of 
the operation of our courts. Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time 
To Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 474, 475–
76 (2006). Public access to filed discovery is therefore imperative because it is part of the 
adjudicatory process, but it is not for unfiled discovery that is never used in court. Id. at 473; 
Erichson, supra note 227, at 362. 
 232. Press Release, Christine Hines, Consumer and Civil Justice Counsel, Public Citizen, 
Sunshine in Litigation Act Would Improve Public Access to Information About Dangerous 
Products (May 20, 2014), https://www.citizen.org/media/press-releases/sunshine-litigation-act-
would-improve-public-access-information-about-0 [https://perma.cc/UG9P-VXN6]. 
 233. Id.  
 234. See Doré, supra note 26, 798–99 (discussing confidentiality requirements in settlements); 
Kotkin, supra note 26, 583–84 (discussing the declining rate of cases proceeding to trial). 
 235. Shapira, supra note 23, at 1239–41. 
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encourage corporations to change so that they pose less of a risk of 
harm to consumers or other stakeholders. 
B. The Risks of Reputational Regulation: Too Little or Too Much? 
A separate concern with reputational regulation is that it is 
difficult to calibrate. Its effects are unpredictable and attenuated, 
raising the risk that the reputational sanctions may be too weak to 
incentivize organizational change. Alternately, the sanctions may 
prove too strong, causing unintended consequences, 
disproportionately sanctioning actors, and creating the conditions for 
abusive use of reputational sanctions. 
1. Problem of Short Attention Span: The Risk of Underdeterrence.  
We live in a twenty-four-hour news cycle. Once the media moves on, 
so do we, and thereby subsides any hope of sustained pressure for 
change. If isolated events like media stories or court filings cannot keep 
our attention for long, what we need are a series of events that catch 
our attention and keep our focus.236 No one information intermediary 
may be able to accomplish that task alone, but the interaction of 
multiple information intermediaries could address that need. This 
Section explains the ways that interactions between media-court 
intermediaries and market-court intermediaries provide a continuous 
stream of reminders to a public with limited attention. Critically, the 
interaction between these intermediaries can partially offset the 
deficiencies of each to keep our attention. 
Media-court interactions amplify the audience for litigation 
information.237 The problem is that the light the media shines is bright 
but brief. In contrast, litigation provides a long time horizon, but the 
public may not pay attention. The solution then is for litigation to keep 
the media’s attention so that it keeps ours. This is easier said than done. 
First, not all lawsuits are equally newsworthy and may not attract 
media attention for very long.238 Better understanding of factors that 
attract media attention to legal developments239 may aid this task but 
 
 236. Shapira, supra note 71, at 29 & n.97 (noting that litigation can add details that keep a 
story in the news cycle).  
 237. Parks, supra note 33, at 445; Linos & Twist, supra note 24, at 228–29. 
 238. Interview with Professor Toni Locy, Dept. of Journalism and Mass Commc’n, 
Washington & Lee University (Dec. 11, 2017). 
 239. See Linos & Twist, supra note 24, at 228 (“[M]any cases taken on by the Supreme Court 
receive extensive coverage at the time of the Court ruling. Cases on politically salient topics, 
especially those involving individual rights, tend to receive disproportionately more media 
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may also open the door to risk of abuse when litigants craft pleadings 
and litigation strategy to chase media attention.240 Second, even when 
journalists are interested in a story, it is becoming increasingly difficult 
for them to cover a lawsuit from start to finish because of litigants’ use 
of protective orders and sealed settlements.241 
Another risk is that business organizations will respond to 
reputational sanctions by investing in shallow changes that address 
public pressure for change but change very little in fact. These public 
relations tactics may focus more on altering public perceptions of an 
organization than on ensuring meaningful organizational change. The 
challenge is twofold: first, how to ensure that stakeholders are not 
satisfied by public relations reforms and instead sustain the pressure 
for meaningful change, and second, how to ensure that stakeholders 
can differentiate between the two. The information asymmetries that 
prevent stakeholders from learning of harms committed by 
organizations can similarly limit their ability to distinguish between 
meaningful organizational change and a public relations strategy 
designed to manage a reputational crisis. 
2. Dangers of Shame: The Risk of Overdeterrence.  Not all 
reputational incentives lead to desirable results. The case illustrations 
in Part II demonstrated the positive benefits of reputational incentives. 
The discussion in this subsection highlights how these same types of 
incentives can lead to undesirable outcomes. It may be hard to ensure 
 
coverage relative to their share of the Court docket. . . . In addition, cases that attract many amicus 
briefs and cases involving multiple dissents garner more coverage, as journalists often consider 
these important and controversial, and thus newsworthy.”); Shapira, supra note 71, at 22 
(“Judicial opinions add saliency by recalling the attention of the media to a certain issue, 
providing media reporters with readymade quotes, and reducing journalists’ risk of defamation 
liability. Opinions also add credibility by certifying existing information.” (footnotes omitted) 
(citing JOHN D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE 95 (2008)). 
 240. Samuel Terilli, Lowering the Bar: Privileged Court Filings as Substitutes for Press 
Releases in the Court of Public Opinion, 12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 143, 146 (2007) (“The tell-tale 
signs of the public relations ploys include the lawsuit or complaint filed to generate publicity for 
a cause through the selection of an obviously attractive target (a competitor or newsworthy 
defendant, for example) coupled with plainly written and very quotable allegations, often 
including outrageous damage claims and other allegations that far exceed what the law requires 
in the pleading. Such pleadings invite public attention as well as a response from the opposing 
side.” (footnotes omitted)); see infra Section III.B.3. I will be exploring this topic further in a 
future work, tentatively titled Public Relations Litigation. Professor Parella Presents at Yale Law 
Workshop on Informal-Formal Governance, WASH. & LEE L. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP BLOG (Oct. 4, 
2017), https://wlulawfaculty.wordpress.com/2017/10/04/professor-parella-presents-at-yale-law-
workshop-on-informal-formal-governance/ [https://perma.cc/D9PD-K8GZ].  
 241. Interview with Professor Toni Locy, supra note 238; see Part III.A. 
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that our use of reputational incentives lead to the former and not the 
latter. After all, reputational incentives are clumsy instruments. They 
are often unpredictable, attenuated, and can give rise to a number of 
unintended consequences. That does not mean we should abandon 
reputational incentives, but only that we must be cautious about how 
we use them. The discussion below highlights three particular concerns 
with reputational incentives: excessive harm, collateral consequences, 
and risk of abuse. 
First, we are accustomed to punishing by reputation. For example, 
shaming sanctions are forms of punishment designed to penalize an 
offender through embarrassment, isolation, and public 
condemnation.242 Examples of shaming sanctions include forcing an 
offender to issue a public apology, displaying labels or stickers singling 
out offenders, or wearing clothing announcing an offender’s crime.243 
What makes shaming sanctions unique is that embarrassment and 
other social consequences are the desired outcome. “Embarrassment 
and consequent social isolation may result from any punishment; but 
with most other sanctions shame and shunning are incidental . . . . With 
shaming penalties, in contrast, embarrassment is the principal purpose 
of the punishment.”244 
The use of shame led some scholars to reject these sanctions out 
of a concern for lasting effects: “When it works, it redefines a person 
in a negative, often irreversible, way. Effective shame sanctions strike 
at an offender’s psychological core. To allow government officials to 
search for and manipulate this vulnerable core is worrisome . . . .”245 
Additionally, even if judges may be skilled at creating shame, they may 
be less skilled at “reconstruct[ing] that core” after the offender has paid 
the penalty.246 
Second, as explained in Part II, criminal investigations, indictment 
and convictions carry significant reputational consequences for the 
affected organization. The positive effect of those reputational 
consequences is that it can force organizations to change. The negative 
effect is that it can lead to collateral consequences that harm innocent 
parties. It is this risk of collateral consequences that encourages 
 
 242. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1820–21 
(2001).  
 243. Id. at 1823. 
 244. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 
1886 (1991). 
 245. Id. at 1920. 
 246. Id. at 1921. 
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prosecutors to focus on reaching cooperative arrangements with 
corporate leadership through DPAs and NPAs.247 What prosecutors 
fear is a repetition of the Arthur Andersen scandal: Arthur Andersen 
was an accounting firm convicted of obstruction of justice following the 
Enron debacle.248 This conviction led to a range of collateral 
consequences and eventually resulted in the firm’s collapse.249 This 
episode illustrated the need for prosecutors to balance “aggressively 
root[ing] out corporate fraud while remaining sensitive to the 
considerable collateral consequences of moving criminally against an 
entire entity.”250 
Finally, reputational sanctions may be abused and levied without 
justification. One reason for abuse is that reputational sanctions can be 
cheap to produce. This Article examined reputational sanctions that 
originated from litigation action, but courts are not necessary to 
produce reputational sanctions; news media, social media, NGOs, 
government officials, and market analysts, among others, can all 
produce reputational sanctions of some variety. Social media in 
particular lowers the production cost of reputational sanctions by 
making it easier to detect conduct deemed “shameful,” and by enabling 
rapid transmission of information. Social media dynamics increase the 
scale of participation in shaming and, consequently, the magnitude of 
the resulting sanction. 
But not all the sanctions imposed across social media or other 
informal media are appropriate; they are levied without a gatekeeper. 
It is the presence of a gatekeeping function performed by the courts 
that distinguish the “reputational regulation” discussed in this Article 
from reputational sanctions generally. By involving the courts in this 
process, those seeking to produce reputational sanctions must pass 
through several “gates,” including pleading standards, professional 
rules, adversarial process of truth finding, and review by judge and jury. 
These gates introduce checks in the production of reputational 
 
 247. Cynthia E. Devers, Todd Dewett, Yuri Mishina & Carrie A. Belsito, A General Theory 
of Organizational Stigma, 20 ORG. SCI. 154, 165 (2009); Garrett, supra note 3, at 880 (“The 
overdeterrent effect of an indictment provided great impetus for the DOJ to resolve prosecutions 
pre-indictment at the charging stage.”). 
 248. Jonathan Weil & Alexei Barrionuevo, Arthur Andersen Is Convicted on Obstruction-of-
Justice Count, WALL. STREET J. (June 16, 2002, 11:28 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB1023469305374958120 [https://perma.cc/6DEX-2E9S].  
 249. See Garrett, supra note 3, at 880 (“The DOJ suffered great criticism following Andersen’s 
collapse and has since moderated its approach to explicitly take into account collateral 
consequences in organizational cases.”). 
 250. Spivack & Raman, supra note 57, at 166. 
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sanctions—checks that are lacking in the more informal production of 
reputational sanctions. 
Even where reputational sanctions are appropriate, the sanctions 
may lead to disproportionate impact because these sanctions are 
difficult to calibrate and their effects are challenging to predict or 
control. One consequence of such impact is that it can lead an 
organization to exit the market instead of improving its conduct. This 
is especially a problem when an exiting organization proves less 
susceptible to reputational sanctions, but still does things at exit that 
are undesirable. The need for change is still present but the toolkit for 
incentivizing that change no longer includes reputational sanctions. 
3. The Risk of Public Relations Litigation.  The very effectiveness 
of reputational sanctions may make organizations, especially 
corporations, easy targets for frivolous lawsuits.251 In the securities class 
action context, those involved in a public offering may contend with 
“strike suits” brought by plaintiff’s firms following a steep and sudden 
drop in stock price.252 The reputational consequences of the suit lead 
the defendants to settle even when they believe the suit is 
unmeritorious; the stigma is so strong that it encourages settlement 
where it might not otherwise occur.253 The concern is that plaintiff’s 
firms recognize the power of reputational sanctions and its effect on 
defendants’ willingness to settle and, therefore, continue to initiate 
future frivolous suits. 
Frivolous suits may not only be brought against organizations but 
also by organizations. When a scandal breaks, organizations associated 
with the one “in the hot seat” may turn to litigation as a public forum 
to voice their side of the story or tiptoe away from their discredited 
associates. These actors are using the litigation stage for reputation 
repair as opposed to reputational sanctioning.254 
For example, following the FIFA scandal, FIFA filed a claim for 
restitution arguing that it was the victim of corruption and not its 
perpetrator.255 It used its pleadings—framed to garner media 
 
 251. See Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 517–20 (discussing imposition 
of Rule 11 sanctions for use of litigation for publicity).  
 252. Bohn & Choi, supra note 40, at 916. 
 253. Alexander, supra note 40, at 532. 
 254. This point will be developed further in my future work, Public Relations Litigation.  
 255. See Victim Statement & Request for Restitution at 4, United States v. Hawit, No. 15-cr-
252 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015), ECF No. 102 (“As a victim of the Defendants’ crimes, FIFA is 
entitled to recover restitution under the Mandatory Restitution to Victims Act.” (citing 18 U.S.C. 
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attention—to explain to the public that the FIFA of 2016 is different 
from the FIFA corrupted by the officials under DOJ investigation.256 
Of course, it could have made the same case through a press release or 
another traditional public relations venue. But a legal complaint allows 
an organization to use a legitimized and trusted system—the courts—
to frame themselves as the victim and their participation in the scandal 
as minor, innocent, or nonexistent. Framing this narrative in the courts 
may garner greater salience with the public than other public relations 
methods.257 
As lawyers, we know that litigation, on some level, is an exercise 
in storytelling.258 Law professors impress upon their first-year students 
the importance of developing facts into persuasive narratives. The 
difference with the storytelling by FIFA or other actors who use 
litigation as a stage is that the primary audience for these litigation 
narratives is not a judge but the media and, by extension, consumers, 
regulators, shareholders, and other stakeholders. This itself may not be 
startling259 but the risks of this practice could be greater when 
employed by corporations that use the litigation stage to pursue public 
relations strategies that had previously played out in press releases and 
other fora. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF REPUTATIONAL SANCTIONS 
The analysis provided in this Article helps to illuminate the 
reputational consequences of different types of litigation or regulatory 
action. The analysis in this Article explores the ways that reputational 
sanctions are produced, which also provides deeper insight into the 
operation of features of our legal system, including reassessing failure, 
effects of litigation on nonbinding law, and information effects 





§ 3663A (2012))). 
 256. Id. at 17 (“The Defendants are responsible for harming FIFA’s brand and bringing FIFA 
and the game itself into disrepute.”).  
 257. See Terilli, supra note 240, at 145 (discussing the use of court filings as “substitute press 
releases” in the Kobe Bryant civil case). 
 258. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 10, at 104 (“[L]itigators know that the most compelling cases 
rest upon the most compelling stories.”). 
 259. See id. at 105. 
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A. Reconsidering the Functions of Activist Litigation: Aggregation 
and Elevation 
Analyzing the reputational effects of litigation may offer litigants 
more reasons for filing lawsuits against organizations because lawsuits 
serve important informational functions by collecting information in 
one place (aggregation) and providing that information with the 
normative significance of a court document (elevation). These 
functions are important in themselves, aside from their ability to 
incentivize organizational change. Through these informational 
functions, lawsuits amplify the audiences for factual and normative 
information—which may otherwise go unnoticed. Important findings 
by domestic and international agencies may be ignored unless a legal 
or media intermediary picks up that information; moreover, the media 
may be more likely to disseminate information after a lawsuit is filed—
a lawsuit alleging human rights abuses, for example, is often more 
newsworthy than a government or NGO report alleging the same.260 As 
a result, the “educational value of litigation is often substantial even 
where the case does not result in a legal victory.”261 
For example, in Hodsdon v. Mars,262 the plaintiffs alleged that 
Mars uses child labor in its cocoa supply chain and that the company 
fails to disclose that abuse to consumers at the point of purchase.263 
Unfortunately, like many similar lawsuits, Hodsdon died at the motion 
to dismiss stage.264 
Despite these litigation losses, lawsuits can still create indirect 
 
 260. Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 487 (“Public interest litigators and 
organizations have come to view litigation as a vehicle for attracting the media. . . . Often, 
litigation attracts the media’s attention in a way that nothing else does.”) (internal citation 
omitted); see also MCADAMS, supra note 34, at 194 (noting that the media is more likely to cover 
a press release if a lawsuit has been filed because lawsuits are more costly than regular press 
releases). 
 261. Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 488. 
 262. Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 263. Class Action Complaint at 1, Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (No. 4:15-cv-04450-RS).  
 264. Order Granting Mars Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (No. 4:15-
cv-04450-RS) at 16; see also Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 654 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
(dismissing claims alleging that Hershey failed to disclose on the packaging of its chocolate 
products that their production involved the use of slave labor and the worst forms of child labor); 
McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (dismissing claims alleging 
that Nestle failed to disclose on the packaging of its chocolate products that their production 
involved the use of slave labor and the worst forms of child labor); Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. 8:15-
cv-01470 (KESx), 2016 WL 471234, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (dismissing claims alleging that 
Mars failed to disclose the likely use of forced labor in the supply chain of its pet food products 
on their packaging).  
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incentives for these corporations to change. First, lawsuits aggregate 
sources of facts and norms for public audiences. Obscure industry 
codes of conduct, multistakeholder initiatives, government reports, 
and company initiatives are brought into view when put under the 
spotlight provided by a legal complaint. In Hodsdon, for example, the 
class action complaint aggregated facts on child labor in cocoa supply 
chains from reports prepared by international organizations 
(International Labor Organization), domestic agencies (Department 
of Labor), media agencies (CNN), universities (Tulane University), 
and NGOs (Fair Labor Association).265 It also aggregated norms that 
bind Mars, but which may be unknown to the average consumer, such 
as Mars’s commitments under its own code of conduct and human 
rights policy, the Harkins-Engel Protocol, or the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.266 These embedded sources 
of norms provide additional measuring sticks with which stakeholders 
can evaluate Mars’s behavior and the behavior of other actors in the 
industry, who may similarly be bound to these norms. 
Lawsuits not only aggregate information but also elevate it. 
Information is packaged within a particular source: a news article, 
Twitter post, law review article, judicial opinion, government press 
release, or international convention. Each of these sources has 
particular normative significance, which may vary depending on which 
stakeholder is receiving that information. 
Legal materials also have their own normative significance. 
Judicial opinions may be especially normatively significant, but 
complaints also communicate normative gravity because they signal 
that some segment of the public cared enough about the organization’s 
conduct to file a complaint and that the conduct at issue may violate 
legal norms, which are a socially significant set of norms. By including 
information from other sources, lawsuits do not only aggregate 
information but also elevate the normative significance of that 
information.267 
For example, in Hodsdon, stakeholders learned that Mars’s 
commitment to eradicate human rights originates from multiple 
sources, including UN guidelines, industry association commitments, 
 
 265. Class Action Complaint, supra note 263, at 2–3, 11–13. 
 266. Id. at 8.  
 267. HANDLER, supra note 36, at 217 (explaining how framing a political struggle in terms of 
legal entitlements accords greater legitimacy and validates the values championed). 
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and its own corporate policies.268 The average consumer may attach 
little normative significance to the UN’s guidelines, but these were 
incorporated into another source that consumers may find more 
significant: Mars’s voluntary corporate policies.269 Additionally, these 
normative obligations were disseminated within the Hodsdon 
complaint—a court document—which may garner more normative 
significance among stakeholders.270 In this way, international norms 
from a distant international organization are elevated through 
corporate policies and industry commitments and into domestic legal 
materials that consumers may take more seriously.271 
B. Reassessing Failure: Process vs. Outcomes 
The analysis of reputational dynamics in this Article illustrates 
how the information produced by litigation can encourage recalcitrant 
organizations to change their practices. These functions are still 
important even if the plaintiff loses the litigation.272 As such, the 
litigation process can matter as much as litigation outcomes for 
achieving socially desirable goals. 
One reason that process matters is that resistance to change also 
incurs reputational costs—costs that matter even if the target 
organization “wins” the litigation. For example, in 2000, a group of 
animal advocacy groups brought a lawsuit against Feld Entertainment 
(Feld), parent company of Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Baileys, 
regarding the treatment of its elephants. Nine years later the case was 
dismissed, but Feld brought RICO charges against the animal welfare 
groups regarding their conduct in the litigation.273 In 2012, Feld settled 
with one animal rights group when it agreed to pay approximately $9 
million to Feld; two years later, the remaining animal advocacy groups 
 
 268. Class Action Complaint, supra note 263, at 8. 
 269. Id. at 17. 
 270. Id.  
 271. The normative significance of different classes of information may vary by cultural 
context. A domestic legal court document, especially a judicial opinion, may garner more 
normative significance for an American consumer than the UN guidelines, and the opposite may 
be true in other countries. Even within the United States, different consumers may disagree about 
the normative significance of different sources of information.  
 272. NeJaime, supra note 36, at 983–88. 
 273. Press Release, Feld Entm’t, Feld Entertainment, Inc. Victorious in Case Brought by 
ASPCA and Other Animal Special Interest Groups (Dec. 30, 2009), https:// 
www.feldentertainment.com/PressRoom/DisplayPressRelease/39470/ [https://perma.cc/S9QW-
LWPZ]. 
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agreed to pay another $16 million to settle with Feld.274 One year later, 
however, Feld announced that it would no longer include elephants in 
its circus shows.275 This decision soon made the circus financially 
unsustainable, leading to Feld’s decision to close it down.276 
Examples of the reputational costs of resistance are not limited to 
the litigation context. Consider the fate of shareholder proposals and 
the information effects produced through that process. Corporate 
scholars argue that not only does the information on the vote and 
voting outcomes attract media coverage, but that “negative votes 
attract even more media coverage and raise questions about the choices 
of the corporate decisionmakers.”277 
Finally, we see similar dynamics at work in public law-making 
processes when private actors publicly resist change. For example, in 
2003, the Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights adopted the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Norms). These Norms 
proposed a global template outlining the obligations that private 
industries have to protect human rights. Several industry associations, 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and 
International Organization of Employers (IOE), expended 
considerable resources in opposing the Norms and ensuring that it did 
not become binding.278 Although the Norms were effectively tabled, 
the resistance to the Norms exerted reputational costs on those 
industry actors who opposed them.279 According to former Shell VP 
 
 274. See Press Release, Feld Entm’t, ASPCA Pays $9.3 Million in Landmark Ringling Bros. 
and Barnum & Bailey Circus Settlement (Dec. 28, 2012), https://www.feldentertainment.com/ 
PressRoom/DisplayPressRelease/62237/ [https://perma.cc/H5W9-9WLR]; Richard Pollock, 
Animal Rights Groups That Paid Circus $15.7 Million File Suit Against Insurers Who Cancelled 
Them in 2010, WASH. EXAM’R (July 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ 
animal-rights-groups-that-paid-circus-157-million-file-suit-against-insurers-who-cancelled-them-
in-2010/article/2550518 [https://perma.cc/7G3Y-3XRF]. 
 275. Richard Pérez-Peña, Elephants to Retire from Ringling Brothers Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/us/ringling-brothers-circus-dropping-elephants-
from-act.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/ZSR2-XEVR] (reporting factors such as increased 
legislation protecting animals, frequent litigation, and constant protests at circus sites).  
 276. Press Release, Feld Ent., Feld Entertainment Announces Final Performances of 
Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus in May 2017 (Jan. 14, 2017), https:// 
www.feldentertainment.com/PressRoom/DisplayPressRelease/85085/ [https://perma.cc/564D-
GZZS]. 
 277. Sale, supra note 176, at 1031 (emphasis added). 
 278. UN Observer & International Report, Shell Leads International Business Campaign, 
GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Mar. 15, 2004), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/225/ 
32247.html [https://perma.cc/S6RM-EJSB]. 
 279. Parella, supra note 97, at 132. 
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Robin Aram, “This episode . . . has not been without damage to 
business. It has linked business with a perception of hostility to human 
rights.”280 
In each of these examples, the legal process “failed” those seeking 
organizational change—the case was dismissed, the vote failed, and the 
transnational instrument was suspended. But the legal process itself 
forced the organizational actors to react, and they did so by resisting. 
That resistance attracted attention to the cause, its champions, and its 
opponents. It is this attention, and its subsequent information effects, 
that make process and its associated information effects productive 
independent of the fate of the litigation, investigation, or other legal 
process. 
This begs the question: what does it mean to fail? These 
reputational dynamics suggest that those evaluating litigation 
strategies, government investigations, or even treaty-making should 
consider the spillover information effects of these processes when 
deciding whether these institutions succeeded or failed.281 These 
spillover effects can be unpredictable, distant, and even hard to 
identify, but they also form part of the picture and should be included 
in analyses of the effects and overall merits of different governance 
strategies.282 
C. Facilitating Pivoting: How Litigation Enhances the Bonds of 
Nonbinding Law 
Reputational dynamics also demonstrate how lawsuits can drive 
organizations to bind themselves to nonbinding law when they might 
otherwise not. There are a variety of nonbinding-multistakeholder 
initiatives, international organization recommendations and 
guidelines, NGO certifications, and other “soft law” instruments that 
seek to regulate businesses’ behavior.283 What these instruments lack is 
 
 280. Emily Rabin, In the Hot Seat: Shell VP Robin Aram, GREEN BIZ (June 21, 2004, 5:00 
PM), https://www.greenbiz.com/news/2004/06/21/hot-seat-shell-vp-robin-aram [https://perma.cc/ 
M5HR-RTQ5]. 
 281. Kishanthi Parella, Treaty Penumbras, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 275, 317–22 (2017) (discussing 
the spillover effects of international law-making on voluntary industry cooperation with 
nonbinding norms).  
 282. Id. 
 283. See, e.g., OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES passim 
(2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KAU-355N]; JOHN 
RUGGIE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE 
UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT, AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK passim (2011). 
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enforcement: they are nonbinding, so corporations are under no 
obligation to adopt them. But because they are formulated under the 
auspices of reputable organizations, they do possess perceived 
legitimacy. 
Here, “reputable” may be relative. Many nonbinding guidelines 
are developed by various divisions of the UN. The UN’s reputation is 
usually superior to that of large corporations routinely criticized for a 
range of violations. It is that reputational, or legitimacy, differential 
that matters for organizational change. Corporate actors will gravitate 
toward legitimacy-enhancing organizations when their own legitimacy 
is at stake.284 They pivot toward the UN or NGO actors when they 
might not otherwise. They seek to publicly associate themselves with 
these more legitimate organizations by forging some form of 
institutional relationship with them; these relationships can then foster 
change. 
For example, DOJ’s criminal investigation caused a legitimacy 
crisis for FIFA that encouraged the latter to adopt a victim narrative 
through which it presented itself as the victim of its own corruption.285 
In order to retain this image—particularly to a doubtful global 
audience—FIFA had to take action consistent with its image as the 
victim and not the culprit.286 Specifically, FIFA’s legitimacy crisis 
meant that it had to distance itself from actors and practices that 
compromised its fragile legitimacy, and instead had to move toward 
actors and practices that would enhance its legitimacy. This led FIFA 
to pivot toward the UN and begin the process of internalizing the UN’s 
human rights standards.287 FIFA may not have pivoted toward the UN 
on its own, but its legitimacy crisis made association with a more 
legitimate organizational partner attractive. 
 
 284. Deegan, supra note 95, at 293. 
 285. See Letter from William A. Burck, Jenny A. Durkan, Thomas Werlen & Stephen M. 
Hauss, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, to Lisa Foster, Victim-Witness Coordinator, 
U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. N.Y. (Mar. 15, 2016), http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/ 
affederation/footballgovernance/02/77/05/70/fifarestitutioncoverletter_neutral.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UR4A-84WK] (“[FIFA] is a victim of the wrongful acts of multiple defendants in the 
above referenced matter . . . .”). 
 286. According to the FIFA Reform Committee:  
[I]n order to restore confidence in FIFA, significant modifications to its institutional 
structure and operational processes are necessary to prevent corruption, fraud, self-
dealing and to make the organisation more transparent and accountable. Recent events 
in particular have damaged FIFA and essential changes to its culture are needed to 
effect lasting reform and to restore its reputation . . . . 
FIFA, supra note 120, at 1; see Parella, supra note 97, at 133.  
 287. See notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
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From the case illustrations examined, organizations are more 
likely to pivot under two conditions: first, when the stakes for 
legitimacy are high, and second, when they are in need of legitimacy. 
The first condition is satisfied, for example, in situations of heightened 
regulatory risk. Organizational legitimacy is particularly important 
when there is some nascent regulatory threat on the horizon. This 
regulatory threat could be prosecutorial, as in the FIFA example, or 
governance, like the Paris Climate Accord.288 
The second condition can be satisfied by lawsuits, for example, 
that can compromise organizations’ public image, removing their 
legitimacy just when they need it most. And because of the media 
attention given to legal proceedings, lawsuits also help keep public 
attention on organizations who are parties to the litigation. These 
legitimacy-depriving consequences of litigation further drive 
defendant organizations to seek the association of organizations with 
greater legitimacy than themselves and borrow institutional practices 
from those organizations in order to appear more legitimate.289 
D. Shaming the Angels: The Reputational Regulation of 
Nongovernmental and Governmental Actors 
For a number of reasons, it is important to consider how 
reputational sanctions influence the behavior of actors besides business 
organizations. First, other types of organizations may take actions that 
we do not like, and we may therefore want to encourage them to 
change their practices through reputational sanctions. Second, by 
sanctioning these actors, we increase the likelihood that they will 
sanction another type of organization. For example, reputational 
sanctions levelled at public actors like regulators can influence their 
willingness to adopt measures against business organizations—
measures that may then trigger a sequence of reputational sanctions 
discussed above.290 Finally, reputational sanctions may impact 
 
 288. See notes 120–21, 201–04 and accompanying text.  
 289. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 100, at 68–70; see Kenneth W. Abbott, Orchestration: 
Strategic Ordering in Polycentric Climate Governance 9–11 (Working Paper) (describing 
“orchestration” as a process by which intergovernmental organizations work with intermediaries 
to exercise governance functions). These dynamics are particularly significant in the transnational 
sphere, where legal institutions are routinely criticized for lack of enforcement capacity. However, 
these lessons are not limited to the transnational context and are also relevant for other situations 
characterized by an “enforcement gap.” 
 290. It is worth noting that reputational regulation does not get off the ground without public 
action in the first instance. Each of the case studies examined in Part II began with an act by a 
public institution—a court filing, government investigation, or multilateral treaty process—that 
PARELLA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2018  11:31 PM 
972  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:907 
regulators or NGOs differently than business organizations. It is one 
thing to shame Exxon Mobil or Walmart—these actors routinely 
confront criticism and bad press. It is a different matter when 
reputational sanctions attach to one of the “good guys,” such as an 
NGO whose mission and identity is dependent upon its reputation for 
positive social impact. We need to assess the nature and extent of the 
effects of reputational sanctions on these actors so that their use still 
leads to socially desirable outcomes. 
For example, Survival International, an NGO, filed a complaint 
against World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the largest conservation NGO in 
the world. Survival International complained about WWF’s financial 
and logistical support for the creation of conservation areas in 
Cameroon, which were created without the free prior and informed 
consent of the Baka, a local indigenous population, in violation of their 
human rights, and for the subsequent “violent abuse to which Baka 
have been subjected by the ecoguards and other law enforcement 
officials who patrol” the conservation areas.291 Survival International 
requested a number of organizational changes to WWF’s practices, 
including capacity-building, independent consultants, and greater 
participation by the Baka.292 
Survival International did not bring these claims to a court or 
agency but to the Organization for Economic Cooperation & 
Development (OECD), an intergovernmental organization that serves 
as a forum for economic development issues. The OECD created 
nonbinding principles and standards known as the OECD Guidelines 
on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) that apply to MNEs associated 
with an adhering country.293 Survival International claimed that WWF 
breached these Guidelines through its actions; Survival International 
therefore instigated the investigation and dispute resolution process 
available under the OECD framework.294 
 
released information into the public space and created the conditions for reputational regulation. 
As a descriptive matter, reputational regulation shares the same root as public regulation because 
both strategies depend on predicate action by public institutions; reputational regulation is 
therefore dependent upon public action.  
 291. SURVIVAL INT’L CHARITABLE TR., COMPLAINT AGAINST WORLD WIDE FUND FOR 
NATURE 5 (2016), http://assets.survivalinternational.org/documents/1527/survival-internation-v-
wwf-oecd-specific-instance.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM7R-CGN5] [hereinafter SPECIFIC 
INSTANCE].  
 292. Id. at 32–34. 
 293. OECD, supra note 283, at 3. 
 294. Under the OECD framework, complainants raise their claims with the relevant National 
Contact Point (NCP), which in this case is the Swiss NCP because WWF’s headquarters are in 
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The complaint and ensuing investigation into WWF gained 
international attention because it is a rare occasion in which an NGO 
is under investigation for violating the OECD Guidelines. 
Traditionally, the “bad actors” under investigation are multinational 
businesses.295 It is also the first time in OECD history that one NGO 
brought a case against another NGO.296 
The complaint brings WWF practices and their human rights 
impact to light. It informs the public about the potential consequences 
of pursuing one social good (conservation) to the detriment of another 
(respect for local indigenous rights). The reputational consequences 
for WWF are both familiar and unique. As explored in Part II.A, WWF 
may experience financial ramifications for its practices: WWF obtains 
a significant portion of its operational revenue from donors, who may 
withhold financial support if they believe that WWF is not a good 
steward of those funds. This case may also demonstrate competitive 
dynamics that we are more accustomed to witnessing in the 
marketplace. By discrediting WWF, Survival International raises its 
own profile and may even benefit from disgruntled donors who 
abandon WWF, perhaps in favor of Survival International (switching 
NGOs).297 The complaint also raises the profile of indigenous 
populations and land rights issues, which may not receive the same 
attention as conservation efforts.298 The complaint could thus 
encourage stakeholders to switch their support from conservation 
groups to indigenous rights advocacy, whether through Survival 
International or another NGO, depending on the elasticity of their 
social preferences (switching causes). 
 
Switzerland and Cameroon does not have an NCP. SPECIFIC INSTANCE, supra note 291, at 2. 
Under the Guidelines, adhering countries create an NCP to help implement the Guidelines and 
resolve any disputes regarding an organization’s failure to abide by the Guidelines. About 
National Contact Points, OECD, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/ [https://perma.cc/E39A-
MRCA]. 
 295. Associated Press, Swiss Wade into Complaint Against WWF over Tribe’s Rights, FOX 
NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/01/05/swiss-wade-into-complaint-
against-wwf-over-tribe-rights.html [https://perma.cc/F88G-PHTT]. 
 296. Survival International vs. WWF, OECD WATCH, http://www.oecdwatch.org/cases/ 
Case_457 [https://perma.cc/P45V-HCWU].  
 297. See HANDLER, supra note 36, at 216 (“Through the drama and newsworthiness of the 
litigation, the groups and the law reformers publicize their cause and demonstrate their worth, 
and thereby hope to stimulate conscience beneficiaries (foundations, unions, and liberals) to 
support their cause.”).  
 298. See id. at 217–18 (explaining that reform groups legitimate their goals and causes through 
framing their objectives in the discourse of rights, which can also aid groups in securing resources 
from donors).  
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But reputational sanctions may have greater impact on an NGO 
compared to the business organizations examined in Part II. In 
addition to reduced funds, a discredited NGO may suffer damage to its 
key strategic resource: its moral authority. This is the resource that 
enables it to pursue its mission through partnerships with other 
organizations, advocate for causes or groups, disseminate information, 
coordinate action, and highlight poor behavior by other organizations. 
All of these functions could be jeopardized by too much damage to its 
moral authority. These consequences distinguish the unique 
vulnerabilities of NGOs to reputational effects. Instead of catalyzing 
change, these sanctions could threaten the future viability of the 
organization, which is an undesirable outcome if these organizations, 
on balance, create a positive social impact. We want them to change, 
not to disappear. It is therefore worth exploring the types and the 
strength of reputational sanctions that are appropriate for NGOs as 
opposed to business organizations.299 
In addition to considering how reputational regulation works on 
NGOs, it is also worth exploring the reputational regulation of other 
actors. The reputational dynamics explained in this Article depend on 
a number of legal institutions, such as government investigations and 
civil lawsuits that, in turn, depend on the actions of public actors, such 
as prosecutors and regulators. These actors are not immune to 
reputational consequences; instead, reputational considerations may 
influence their own actions as well. 
As demonstrated by the case illustrations in Part II, “[r]egulators 
are among the key mediators of industries’ and individual firms’ 
reputations.”300 But regulators also have their own reputations to 
manage. A regulator’s reputation is based on “externally held beliefs 
regarding an agency’s efficacy in pursuing its formal and informal 
mandate, its technical expertise, and the legitimacy of its aims and the 
means it employs.”301 Like the corporations they regulate, regulators 
are also vulnerable to reputation risk; the way they respond to these 
reputational risks impacts, in turn, the reputational sanctions they 
create for corporate actors.302 
 
 299. This Article does not explore this issue but merely posits the possibility that reputational 
sanctions must be calibrated differently when levied against NGOs. 
 300. Sharon Gilad & Tamar Yogev, How Reputation Regulates Regulators: Illustrations from 
the Regulation of Retail Finance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION, 
supra note 63, at 320, 321. 
 301. Id. at 322. 
 302. Id. at 321. 
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For example, institutional factors not only constrained FIFA’s 
choices but also influenced the choices made by the government 
authorities pursuing FIFA. Specifically, jurisdictional competition 
between different criminal enforcement bodies kept the pressure on 
FIFA,303 but that external institutional pressure on FIFA was itself a 
product of interaction between different organizations, each vying for 
status and recognition.304 Their desire to do so is itself a product of 
where they stand in relation to each other and in relation to other 
government bodies on their home turf.305 
E. Toward Information Environments: Extending Reputational 
Regulation to Other Legal Institutions 
It is not only litigation that produces reputational consequences 
for organizational actors. International law-making processes also have 
reputational effects for industry actors by raising the profile of policy 
 
 303. According to ESPN, the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Eastern District of New York’s 
(EDNY) head of the organized crime unit, John Buretta, was eager to raise the profile of EDNY, 
and the FIFA investigation offered an opportunity for EDNY to come out from under the shadow 
of the high-profile Southern District of New York. Shaun Assael, Brett Forrest & Vivek 
Chaudhary, The FBI vs. FIFA, ESPN MAG. (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.espn.com/ 
espn/feature/story/_/id/14767250/the-exclusive-story-how-feds-took-fifa [https://perma.cc/ UN
4H-PT73]. Additionally, Swiss authorities aided the U.S. criminal investigation into FIFA by 
arresting and extraditing individuals charged by U.S. authorities. Press Ass’n, Swiss Authorities 
Agree To Extradite Venezuelan Fifa Official to USA, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2015, 10:36 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/sep/23/swiss-authorities-approve-extradiction-usa-
fifa-official-rafael-esquivel-football [https://perma.cc/93XC-7PU6]. However, “Swiss authorities 
have been wary of appearing as puppets of the United States . . . .” Rebecca R. Ruiz, In FIFA 
Inquiry, Switzerland Aids U.S. but Is Wary of Being Eclipsed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/sports/soccer/in-fifa-inquiry-switzerland-aids-us-but-is-
wary-of-being-eclipsed.html [https://perma.cc/CP4C-UEDF]. It is therefore no surprise that Swiss 
authorities conducted their own investigation of FIFA: “Switzerland’s privacy laws have stoked a 
behind-the-scenes competition, keeping potential key evidence out of the immediate reach of 
American prosecutors at the same time that Swiss prosecutors have trumpeted their own 
independent criminal inquiry into global soccer’s top leadership.” Id. (explaining that 
Switzerland’s attorney-general, Michael Lauber, observed the reputation-enhancing benefits of 
the investigation for Loretta Lynch and pursued similar benefits). 
 304. See Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: 
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 INT’L ORG. 
745, 748 (2011) (“[L]ead regulators from large markets may alter domestic enforcement decision 
making in other jurisdictions . . . .”). 
 305. See Steven Brint & Jerome Karabel, Institutional Origins and Transformations: The Case 
of American Community Colleges, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS 63, 348–49 (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991) (explaining the evolution 
of community colleges with reference to the prominence of other players in post-secondary 
education). 
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issues and informing the public of organizational conduct.306 Critically, 
even law-making initiatives that “fail” place certain issues and policy 
tools on the table in a way that organizational actors cannot ignore 
when developing alternative, often private, governance strategies.307 
The information produced by legal institutions also incentivizes 
organizational responses in ways other than through reputational 
sanctioning. For example, Richard McAdams explains how legal 
institutions serve coordination functions because “legal 
pronouncement can make the prescribed outcome salient or ‘focal,’ 
thereby creating self-fulfilling expectations that this outcome will 
occur.”308 As a consequence, these pronouncements are “likely to 
prompt some compliance independent of the threat of legal sanctions, 
merely because the common knowledge that everyone heard this 
particular message makes the named behavior focal.”309 According to 
McAdams, information supplied by legal institutions can be 
particularly effective at creating focal points for coordination because 
of the publicity accorded legal information, its unique abilities to be 
pronounced by public officials and backed by sanctions, and the 
reputation of judges and legislators for predicting behavioral change.310 
These features of information disclosure by legal institutions suggest 
that actors will often respond to that information even if they do not 
fear sanctions and are agnostic on the legal institution’s moral 
authority. 
Additionally, information from legal institutions can encourage 
organizational change by altering expectations of the status quo.311 
According to behavioral research, “[l]aw can create status quos: when 
people are given two options and told that one is the default preferred 
by a (domestic) legal regime, participants treat the default rule as the 
status quo.”312 Legal institutions create a perception of the status quo 
 
 306. Parella, supra note 281, at 317–22.  
 307. Id. at 301–02 (discussing prospective treaties as “penalty defaults” because “the draft text 
already place[s] certain categories of terms on the table [and] [t]his influences the mandate of 
topics and issues addressed by voluntary regulation”).  
 308. Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal 
Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87, 88 (2005). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 
1669–72 (2000). 
 311. Arden Rowell & Josephine van Zeben, A New Status Quo? The Psychological Impact of 
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 1 EUR. J. OF RISK REG. 49, 49 (2016).  
 312. Id. at 50.  
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that “identifies an endowment baseline against which subsequent 
losses (or gains) will be measured.”313 Critically, this baseline is used to 
judge future action, so that failure to achieve the status quo is perceived 
as a loss.314 Fidelity to that baseline (and the psychological impact of 
failing to achieve it) offers an alternative mechanism for encouraging 
organizations to change their behavior even in the absence of 
traditional enforcement mechanisms.315 
Reputational sanctions, coordination functions, and baseline 
shifting are some of the ways that information from legal institutions 
encourage organizational change independent of these institutions’ 
coercive powers. As such, these functions reveal a broader spectrum of 
capabilities possessed by legal institutions to alter organizational 
behavior. 
These capabilities expand further if we do not view their 
informational effects in isolation but as part of a broader institutional 
“information environment” in which an organization or a population 
of organizations resides.316 The discussion above explains how 
information effects are not limited to one type of legal institution. 
Instead, a broad range of legal institutions exhibit information-
dissemination features, including civil and criminal litigation, agency 
action317 and international treaty making. The result is that there are a 
range of information-producing institutions that surround an 
organizational actor.318 
For example, in the business and human rights context, consider 
the following institutions that can constitute a transnational 
corporation’s immediate information environment: activist litigation in 
its home state, criminal investigation in host state, mandatory social 
reporting requirements at local and regional levels, international 
treaty-making processes, and shareholder proposals regarding human 
rights due diligence. Each of these institutions helps to correct the 
 
 313. Id. at 51. 
 314. Id. at 52. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Jessica F. Green & Robert O. Keohane, Organizational 
Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance, 70 INT’L ORG. 247, passim (2016) 
(explaining the concept of “organizational ecology” and the ways that the institutional 
environment influences the processes of growth and change for organizational populations). 
 317. See Cortez, supra note 15, at 1371 (explaining the use of publicity as a sanction); 
Gellhorn, supra note 15, at 1420 (discussing the risks of adverse agency publicity); Wu, supra note 
15, at 1851 (discussing the informal regulatory function of public threats). 
 318. Abbott et al., supra note 316, passim; DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 100, at 66–67. 
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information asymmetries between the public and organizational actors 
regarding the latter’s conduct. 
But informational environments, made up of more than one 
information-producing legal institution, have the following advantages 
over individual informational institutions for encouraging 
organizational change: magnitude, variety, and temporal effects. First, 
the more institutions, the more information released to the public, 
which results in greater attention and higher levels of awareness 
regarding organizational conduct, all of which increases pressure for 
organizations to respond. 
Second, having a larger number of institutions not only increases 
the overall pressure for changes but also offers different incentives for 
change. The information released by each type of institution has its 
own characteristics and therefore could vary in the types of 
reputational sanctions or other informational effects produced. For 
example, governmental investigation may produce regulatory spillover 
effects but other institutions may not. Alternatively, legislative 
institutions may encourage coordination effects that investigations do 
not normally produce. An expanding range of institutions broadens the 
spectrum of incentives offered by an organization’s informational 
environment. 
Finally, the staggered release of information by institutions can 
help address the temporal limitations associated with reputational 
shaming. Our memories are short and so is the time horizon for many 
media stories. Public condemnation that follows media coverage of 
litigation may be swift but also brief. If institutions release information 
sequentially, however, media coverage may be more likely to remain 
with the story and keep the public’s attention on the organization at 
issue. For these reasons, the willingness of organizations to change may 
vary based on what its immediate information environment looks like. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explores how our adjudicative institutions—litigation, 
government investigation, administrative action—create informational 
effects that have reputational consequences for organizations. These 
consequences provide four types of incentives for organizations to alter 
their behavior. Financial incentives convert information about 
organizational misconduct into financial consequences for the 
misbehaving organization. Spillover incentives occur when the conduct 
of one organization compromises the reputation of its peers. Policy 
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incentives encourage organizations to change in order to appear more 
legitimate during significant policy debates concerning them. Finally, 
incumbent organizations use reputational sanctions to delegitimize a 
potential competitor in the market, thereby using reputation and social 
norms as barriers to entry for new business organizations in a market. 
Understanding these reputational incentives has implications for 
the objectives that litigants pursue in litigation because the process may 
be more important that the outcome. Part of the value of litigation is 
its dissemination of information about organizational behavior to the 
public, often with the aid of the news media. This analysis reveals how 
the informational effects of government investigation can also 
precipitate organizational change. These adjudicative institutions 
create different types of reputational sanctions that vary by the 
organization and the stakeholder evaluating its reputation. 
Collectively, these reputational sanctions reinforce each other and 
incentivize organizations to change. 
 
